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'Nothing spreads like fear' - from the movie 'Contagion'(2011) 
 
Abstract 
 
The global financial crisis in recent times has created a deep appreciation for the strong 
connectivity between the world economies. First regarded as a domestic shock, the  subprime 
mortgage crisis in the United States ultimately created intense ripple effects across the 
borders, leading to the understanding that there are mechanisms in place between economies 
that can transmit a domestic crisis internationally. Loss of confidence in securitized products 
based on the real assets market led to a crippling breakdown in the financial market, creating 
economic and financial instability. Having differentiated the term contagion, with that of 
spillover and interdependence, an attempt was made to identify the contagious effects of the 
crisis in the U.S. on financial markets of the G8 countries and Norway. Both stock markets 
and government bond markets in the economies show comovement during the financial crisis 
of 2007-2008, with volatility in asset returns increasing. Tests for contagion using cross-
market correlation showed that while contagious effects are visible with regard to stock 
markets, it was less evident in the government bonds markets.  
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SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Prologue 
 
Crises or shocks have plagued the financial systems of individual countries and the global 
market as a whole for decades. In their bestselling publication 'This Time is Different', authors 
Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff provide an extensive study of financial crises dating 
back to nearly 800 years; their target - to show that 'we have been there before'. Most often, a 
shock occurs in a specific market or a group of market for many reasons like increase in asset 
prices, changes in interest rates, currency devaluation, etc. Due globalization having brought 
the world closer, shocks that were thought to be country specific (or crises in one region ) 
have been followed by crises in other countries or regions.  Such financial crises has  had an 
impact on countries that are geographically distant, structurally different economies and those 
who do not share significant economic links such as trade. Therefore, it is evident that there 
are certain mechanisms in place that transmit or propagate a domestic shock internationally.  
In the summer of 2007 came a global financial crisis that was unprecedented in terms of scale 
and severity. It proved to be the worst global financial meltdown to occur after the World War 
II, with the 1929 stock market crash leading to the Great depression being the most severe so 
far. Financial systems lost billions of dollars in value and the social impact was equally 
intense due to loss of personal wealth caused by unemployment, decline in value of personal 
assets and loss of savings and investments. Unlike most of the crises, the financial crisis of 
2007-2008 affected millions of people around the globe either directly or indirectly. 
The media frenzy during this crisis was intense as well, with everyone trying to make sense of 
the mayhem. A multitude of technical jargon was thrown around by the media, and words like 
'global financial crisis', 'spillover', 'securitization', 'sub-prime mortgage', and more 
interestingly 'contagion' were made popular. Contagion is a term one commonly associates 
with the field of medicine and epidemiology. When applying the definition of medical 
contagion to a financial context, financial contagion can be clarified as the spreading of 
financial illness from one entity to another through a particular channel of transmission. 
Academics have specifically differentiated 'contagion' with the term 'spillover', and proceeded 
to introduce new technical terms such as interdependence.  
9 
 
This thesis is organized in the following manner. The first section of the report gives an 
introduction to the thesis topic 'Financial Contagion during the financial crisis 2007-2008' and 
the motivation behind it. A formal presentation of the purpose or objective behind the thesis is 
made in this section, along with the limitations associated with the study.  
A prologue to financial crises is laid out in section two, where some of the most significant 
financial crises in the twentieth century are described.  
Section three provides a comprehensive explanation of the two main sub-topics stemming 
from the thesis topic; 'contagion' and 'financial crisis of 2007-2008'. In subsection one, a 
literature review of contagion is carried out, where the term is defined using different points 
of view. Theories of contagion are then discussed, to indentify how shocks are propagated 
from the market of origin to other different markets. Methods of measuring contagion gives 
an overture to the measurement procedure selected for the thesis quantitative analysis. 
Subsection two gives a comprehensive account of the financial crisis of 2007/2008, since it is 
the specific event under investigation for evidence of contagion. The background to the crisis, 
factors that triggered it and a timeline of the crisis are recounted in the section.  
In Section four, the specific approach to the problem is discussed in detail. First, there is a 
description about the theoretical model used to identify if contagion has taken place during 
the recent financial crisis. The test for contagion using the cross-market correlation between 
asset returns is the measurement method highlighted in the model.  An extensive description 
of the methodology in statistical analysis is laid out, followed by some statistical tests carried 
out during the regression analysis.   
Section five presents the results of the quantitative analysis where the test for contagion is 
carried out using stock market returns. It first explains the data and the sample being used for 
the quantitative analysis of contagion in the stock markets. Afterwards, results are presented 
in the order of different techniques adopted to measure contagion.  
Section six applies the theoretical model to the government bond market, to investigate 
whether contagion took place in this market during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. A short 
description about the specific market, data and the sample is given before the results of the 
statistical analysis are presented at the end.  
The final section provides inference and implications of the results, together with a conclusion 
and a discussion on further extensions and possible other application.  
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1.2  Motivation  
 
The motivation for the thesis has its roots in the two classes undertaken during the second and 
third semesters of the masters program. The class of 'Investments' gave the very first 
introduction to the study of financial crises, where the students were made aware that it is 
dynamic and upcoming area of study. As part of the curriculum, a graded project was carried 
out on the impact of the recent financial crisis on two countries and whether economic 
indicators influence the probability of a potential crisis. In the next semester, the subject 
'Market Risk' carried us further into the study of extreme events, where many statistical 
models of measuring and predicting such events were explained in details. A project similar to 
the one earlier introduced the students to the concepts of bubbles and how they can be 
measured and predicted. The concept of contagion was discussed briefly and therefore an 
interest was created to study this phenomenon in more detail.  
 
1.3  Purpose of the Study 
 
The overall purpose of the study is to identify whether financial contagion took place during 
the financial crisis of 2007-2008. A more specific formulation of this purpose of the thesis is : 
to evaluate if financial contagion occurred in the stock markets and the  government bond 
markets of the G8 countries (consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, 
United Kingdom and the United States) and Norway during the recent global financial crisis 
of 2007-2008.  
Based on the main purpose of the thesis, some of the more precise objectives are; to define 
and understand the many aspects of contagion, to study how contagion can be transmitted, to 
identify how the financial crisis in concern was triggered or what exactly was the catalyst of 
the crisis, to evaluate how market volatility affects the correlation coefficient calculation and 
how it can influence the conclusions drawn from the measurement (if there is an incorrect 
inference of contagion) and finally, to identify if an adjustment to the bias will give a more 
consistent result.  
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1.4  Significance of the Study 
 
There are several aspects of the thesis that add value or contribute to the significance of the 
study. Though many studies have been conducted on contagious effect of the financial crisis 
of 2007-2008,  this particular study measures contagion in two different markets, namely the 
stock market and the government bond market. A unique dataset including the members of the 
G8 together with Norway is used to differentiate the thesis from other studies. The 
methodology has explored several alternative ways of modeling and analyzing the market 
data to evaluate the effect of heteroskedastic bias on cross-market correlation coefficient. An 
attempt is also made to link the results of the data analysis to the actual events that took place 
within the countries in the sample during the defined period of crisis.   
 
1.5  Limitations 
 
The most fundamental limitations to the thesis stem from the theoretical structure which is  
obtained from the paper 'No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring Stock Market 
Comovements', by economists Kristin Forbes and Roberto Rigobon(October 2002).  
Insufficient details about the actual statistical analysis conducted by the authors have limited 
the thesis in its ability to produce a similar analysis. Description of the data analysis process, 
along with the tools and methods used,  was strongly inadequate and vague. Therefore, many 
independent assumption have been made with regard to the methods applied, filtering 
techniques as well as in order to interpret the results. It should be also be noted that the two 
assumptions of no endogeneity and no omitted variables in the theoretical model can be 
challenged. If these two assumption become invalid, the method of testing for contagion using 
an adjusted correlation coefficient can be invalidated.  Limitations can occur due to missing 
data, errors in calculations and statistical inferences all which a natural part of any thesis or 
research paper. A severe time restriction has also resulted in a relatively lesser number of 
analyses and scenarios.  
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SECTION TWO: FINANCIAL CRISES 
 
2.1  What is a Financial Crisis? 
 
As a prelude to defining a financial crisis, the importance of a well-functioning financial 
system in an economy need to be identified. Financial institutions play a unique and vital role 
within the economy, because they act as intermediaries between parties that need to borrow 
and parties willing to lend or invest. An effective financial system results in a healthy 
economy, where funds are transferred in an optimum manner to economic agents who have 
feasible investment opportunities. Thereby, a financial crisis or a financial crash prevents the 
financial system from functioning smoothly and efficiently. 
According to Acharya (et.al. 2009), a financial crisis is a phenomenon caused by systematic 
risk. Systematic risk is where the financial system and financial models applied become 
unstable. It can also be viewed as a widespread failure of financial institutions or the freezing 
up of capital markets that can substantially reduce the supply of capital to the real economy. 
Such a situation is harmful to all market participants because the investors suffer substantial 
losses and there is a decline in level of confidence over the soundness of the financial system 
as well as financial assets. 
A concrete definition of a financial crisis is given by  Mishkin(1992), where he states that it is 
'a disruption to financial markets in which adverse selection and moral hazard problem 
become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those 
who have the most productive investment opportunities.' He lays out five primary factors that 
cause a financial crisis; an increase in interest rates, stock market declines, increase in 
uncertainty, bank panics and unanticipated declines in aggregate price levels. 
Using a more expansionary approach to categorizing shocks to the financial market , Carmen 
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff in their book 'This time is different'(2009), have  identified 
different types of crises based on two broad thresholds. Crises defined by quantitative 
thresholds are Inflation crisis, Currency crashes and currency debasement, while crises 
defined by events are banking crises, external debt crises and domestic debt crisis
1
.  
                                                          
1
 A short description of crises defined by events is given in Appendix I 
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An inflation crisis, often known as 'Hyperinflation', is a situation where a certain market or 
country experiences a high and virtually accelerating level of inflation. Such a situation 
causes a rapid increase in cost of goods and supply of money in the economy. Rienhart and 
Rogoff use an annual inflation rate of 20 percent or higher to term an incident of 
hyperinflation to qualify as a 'crisis'. A currency crisis is where the currency used in one 
market becomes unstable by losing value. Such a devaluation normally occurs when there is a 
balance-of-payment deficit or when there is heavy speculation within the market about the 
ability of a government in backing their currency. An annual depreciation of 15 percent or 
more against the U.S: dollar (or any other relevant anchor currency such as U.K. pound or the 
euro) is termed to be a currency crisis by the two authors. They also highlight another crisis 
known as 'Currency debasement', which occurred during an era in which the principal means 
of exchanges was metallic coins. Even though it is not important in modern times, it was  
nonetheless an integral part in the study of the history of financial crises through two 
centuries. The first type of currency debasement is benchmarked as a 5 percent reduction or 
more in the metallic content of coins. The second type of crisis under currency debasement is 
a situation of currency 'reforms' or conversions, where a new currency replaces a much-
depreciated earlier currency in circulation. It is relevant to the present time and examples are 
presented from Brazil, China and Zimbabwe to highlight such crises of currency debasement.  
Reinhart and Rogoff provide a large number of examples and data from nearly 800 in the 
history to highlight how every financial crisis appears unique at the beginning. But once a 
closer look is taken, it is easy to identify nearly every crisis has certain fundamental triggers 
or factors, recurring in different ways.  
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2.2  History of Financial Crises 
 
This section discusses five of the most significant financial crises during the last century , 
starting with the 1929 'Great First Contraction'. The most recent global financial recession of 
2007-2008, which is identified as the 'Second Great Contraction' (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009) 
will be discussed in length in Section three of the thesis.  
2.2.1  The 1929 U.S. Stock Market Crash 
 
The stock market crash of 1929 became known as a very powerful and significant financial 
crisis in the U.S. history. The severity was not only due to the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
losing 90% of its value between its record high close of 381.2 on September 3, 1929, and its 
subsequent bottom of 41.22 on July 8, 1932 (Amadeo, 2013). But the crash of 1929, also 
known as 'Black Tuesday' was the event that pulled America as well as many other regions 
into the Great Depression, from which it took America nearly 10 years to recover. 
After the World War I ended in 1918, the United States experienced the 'roaring twenties' 
where the economy was fueled by industrialization and popularization of new technologies. 
Interest rates were kept low to promote investment. Spurred by the bull market, investors 
purchased shares aggressively, with the notion that stock market can only go up. Purchasing 
shares on margin became popular, and investors flocked to the market with mortgages taken 
out on homes and life-savings. 
In 1929, the Federal Reserve increased interest rates and the market entered in to a bear state. 
Panic selling began to occur when investors realized that inflated prices were just based on 
speculation, not based on fundamental economic strength of companies. Margin investors 
went bankrupt almost instantly when the stock market crashed in October 28 and 29. By the 
end of the 1929 stock market crash, a staggering $16 billion worth of market capitalization 
had been lost from NYSE stocks(Colombo, 'The Stock Market Crash of 1929'). Making 
matters worse, most of the banks have invested their retailer deposits in the stock market. As a 
result of the market crash, people lost their savings and the banks had to declare bankruptcy. 
With the financial system in disarray and millions of dollars worth of money lost, the Great 
Depression followed the economic crisis, where nearly 1/3 of the American population was 
forced to live under the poverty line. 
 
15 
 
2.2.2  The 1987 Stock Market Crash 
 
On October 19, 1987, the global stock market, along with the associated futures and options 
markets, crashed. This day became known as ‘Black Monday’, because the event had  swift 
and severe repercussions, and also it revealed the weakness of the actual trading systems and 
how they can be strain under extreme conditions.  
 
During the period before the crash, equity markets in the U.S. were posting strong gains, with 
new investors such as hedge funds entering the stock markets.  But the months leading up to 
the crisis saw the global interest rates increasing and the U.S facing a growing trade deficit 
and a decline in the dollar value. A bullish stock market fueled by low interest rates, hostile 
takeovers, leveraged buyouts and merger mania, was attracting many investors. On top of 
that, financial markets were experiencing an increase in the use of ‘program trading’ 
strategies where computers and computer models were used in trading, stock market analysis, 
etc. Investors were popularly using a program strategy of ‘portfolio insurance’, where stock 
index futures were used to cushion equity portfolios against broad stock market declines. 
 
Between October 14 and 16, several events in U.S. caused anxiety among investors, resulting 
in a decline in the equity markets. With rising interest rates, many institutional money 
managers were trying to hedge their portfolios at the same time. There was a movement from 
stocks to relatively safer bonds, with market decline further augmented by some technical 
factors.  
 
By Monday morning on the 19th of October (termed as Black Monday), the stock index 
futures market was besieged with billions of dollars of sell orders within minutes. It caused an 
immediate crash in both futures and stock markets. A mass hysterical selling of shares 
brought on by unreliable information and irrational behavior of investors’ overwhelmed the 
stock markets as well. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 508 points, which is 22.6% 
2
, 
S&P 500, and Wilshire 5000 declined between 18 and 23 percent on the day amid 
deteriorating trading conditions and the S&P 500 futures contract declined by 29 percent. The 
crash of 1987 was the day that the USA stock markets experienced the single largest drop in 
history, though it did not cause a recession or hamper economic development 
                                                          
2
  Browning, E.S. (2007-10-15). "Exorcising Ghosts of Octobers Past". The Wall Street Journal (Dow Jones & 
Company). 
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2.2.3  The 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis  
 
During the early 1990s, Mexico was recovering from a decade filled with economic shocks 
such as 1982 debt crisis and the 1986 collapse of oil prices. Inflation was low and foreign 
investment has started to flood back in to the economy, with the central bank accumulating 
billions of dollars’ worth reserves.  
But the current account deficit of Mexico was on a rise; it has ballooned from $6 billion in 
1989 to more than $20 billion in 1992 and 1993 (Whitt, 1996). Observers were worried that 
the Mexican currency peso was becoming overvalued, which can cause a reduction of exports 
alongside an increase in imports, ultimately leading to a trade deficit crisis. The country had a 
crawling peg exchange rate system, where government intervention kept the exchange rate 
within a narrow target band. Mexico’s rate of inflation was becoming consistently higher than 
the sum of inflation rate of USA and rate of currency depreciation. This resulted in the real 
exchange rate increasing; making imports from USA cheaper and further contributing to the 
contributing to the current account deficit. 
The political environment in Mexico started to become unstable due to various events such as 
political assassinations, rebellions and other key political figures stepping down from 
government positions. Stock markets declined after such events, and fears of political 
instability set of widespread alarms in the financial market. Crisis of confidence affected the 
banking system and made it difficult for the government of Mexico to roll over some of their 
debts. By the end of 1994, Mexico’s reserves have eroded from £29 billion to $6 and the 
government intervened heavily to maintain the level of economic activity.  
 
The series of internal political shocks, coupled with an external shock of rising U.S. interest 
rates, prompted Mexico to announce the devaluation of the peso on December 20, 1994. The 
government announced that it was abandoning the exchange rate target bank and allowing the 
peso to float. The peso plunged to new lows, where by December 27 the exchange rate was 
5.7 pesos per dollar, a decline of nearly 40% in dollar terms, and further declining to 8 pesos 
per dollar in mid-1995. Interest rates soared, companies operating with dollars went bankrupt 
resulting in employee layoffs, and the government was unable to secure funding through 
credit markets. Many foreign investors abandoned ship and Mexico was plunged in to a 
serious economic crisis. 
 
17 
 
2.2.4  The 1997 Asian Crisis 
 
The period before the 1997 Asian crisis saw the South East Asian countries enjoying 
unprecedented economic growth. Exports have increased in double-digit rates in Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong. The nature of these exports had also shifted in recent 
years from basic materials and products such as textiles to complex and increasingly high 
technology products, such as automobiles, semi-conductors, and consumer electronics
3
. 
Investment was booming with capital flowing in to these market, but there was also high level 
of heavily leveraged investment. 
One trigger for the crisis proved to be the decline in the semi-conductors industry in Korea, 
where excess capacity was becoming evident, with the prices plunging and the firms unable to 
repay their debts taken to finance the excess capacity. At the same time,  a previous boom in 
the Bangkok property market was deteriorating. These events were being played out in other 
markets where the heavy investment in industrial assets and property was causing serious 
problems with regard to repaying loans taken out in US Dollars. While the export markets 
were still maintaining good levels, imports of capital and retails goods have been increasing 
even faster. Several East Asian nations were left with dangerous current account deficits. 
In 1997, the stock market in Thailand began to decline and a speculative attack was adding 
pressure to the Thai baht. The country bowed to the inevitable and devalued the Thai baht to  
float freely against the US Dollar in July 1997. At first, it was considered as a domestic or a 
localized crisis. But the events in Thailand prompted investors to reassess and test the 
robustness of currency pegs and financial systems in the region. A domino effect was soon in 
place, with Malaysia and Philippine following suit with currency depreciations. By the fall of 
1997, the crisis has spread to South Korea, Hong Kong and China. In the year after collapse 
of the baht peg, the value of the most affected East Asian currencies fell 35-83% against the 
U.S. dollar (measured in dollars per unit of the Asian currency), and the most serious stock 
declines were as great as 40-60%
4
. Ultimately, IMF and later the World Bank stepped in to 
provide rescue funding to Thailand, Indonesia (where the crisis reached extreme heights 
economically, socially and politically) and South Korea.  
                                                          
3 Charles W.L. Hill 'The Asian Financial Crisis' (University of Washington) 
4
 Ramon Moreno 'What Caused East Asia's Financial Crisis'( August 7, 1998) Economic Letter, Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco  
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But the crisis was not contained within the region and soon Japan was facing difficulties and 
uncertainty when a top brokerage firm and one of the top 10 Japanese banks went bankrupt, 
spreading fears of default and crisis. Stock markets declined in U.S. and other major markets. 
In June 1998, Russian stock market crashed, with the financial system stretched to the 
breaking point. U.S. and IMF pledged support, but the impact of economic troubles in Russia 
reverberated throughout Latin America.  Likewise, the sequence of events starting with a 
foreign currency crisis, ultimately ended up spilling over to the global markets. 
 
2.2.5  The Dotcom Crash of 2000 
 
The dotcom bubble is a speculative bubble related to the shares of internet companies and is 
also known as internet bubble or Information Technology bubble. The 1990's saw the 
accessibility and user-friendliness of personal computer expanding. It was fast becoming a 
useful business tool, where various specialized applications were helping users to engage in a 
wide variety of business activities such as tax preparing to word processing. U.S. companies 
started to focus more on computer software development, which had high profit margins as 
opposed to hardware development.  
The shares of software companies became strong performers in the 1990s, with the 
enthusiasm generated promoting many startups. Venture capitalists eventually entered the 
industry by proving funding and facilitating public issue of shares for those up-and-coming 
startup IT companies. Buoyed by a healthy economic environment of low interest rates and 
inflation rates, the boom in the internet and software industry drove the U.S. stock markets to 
new height (the technology-dominated NASDAQ rose from 1000 to over 5000 points during 
the period 1995-2000) . At the peak of the dot-com bubble in 1999, it was said that a new 
millionaire was created every 60 seconds in Silicon Valley (Colombo, The Dot-com Bubble, 
2012) 
But the lack of concrete business plans and moreover, a lack of proper flow of earnings, was 
putting a strain on the bubble. In the year 2000, investors started to realize that most of the 
growth in the technology industry was brought on by speculation and 'fad-investment' rather 
than based on solid returns and sustainable expansion. The NASDAQ fell significantly and 
the share prices of most 'dotcom' companies reduced to virtually nothing. With many firms 
being liquidated, IT professionals were left without jobs and with worthless stock options. 
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SECTION THREE: KEY SEGMENTS  
 
The main title or the fundamental question  studied in the thesis is whether financial contagion 
took place during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Before venturing in to the various aspects 
of the method and process of measuring for contagion, a closer look is taken of the two key 
points stemming from the topic; contagion and the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The 
following sections provides a comprehensive study of the two aspects in order to get a better 
understanding of the thesis.   
3.1. Contagion: A Literature Review 
 
In recent times, shocks or crises that were thought to be country specific, has had an impact 
on countries that are geographically distant and structurally different economies. There are 
instances were transmission of a financial crisis has taken places between markets that have 
no significant linkages through any channels. A good example for such a situation is the 
considerable effect of the 1998 Russian 'Ruble Crisis' on the economy of Brazil. These two 
countries were very different in geographic location and economic structures, and did not 
appear to share any direct linkages through channels like trade. But soon after the Russian 
ruble was devalued in 1998, the Brazilian stock market fell by over 50 percent. This is an 
indication that there are various channels or methods through which shocks can be propagated 
from one market to another. The question remains, does the above example qualify as 
contagion?  
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3.1.1 What is Contagion 
 
The word 'contagion' is unanimous with the field of medicine, where it is said to be ' the 
transmission of a disease by direct or indirect contact' (www.merriam-webster.com). A more 
general definition of contagion from the same source is that it is 'an influence that spreads 
rapidly'. The same term is being more and more used in the financial context as well, and 
financial contagion has become a much discussed area of study. When perusing the various 
theoretical literature on this subject, it is evident that a surge of interest in contagion occurred 
in 1990's. This particular decade has seen many severe financial and currency crises, such as 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism attacks of 1992, the Mexico peso collapse of 1994, the East 
Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian collapse of 1998 and the Brazilian devaluation of 1999. But 
the East Asian crisis is often cited as a global shock that spurred policymakers and economists 
to conduct intense research in identification and analysis of the causes and effects of financial 
contagion.  
 
3.1.2. Definitions of financial contagion 
 
A basic definition of the term is given as 'the likelihood that significant economic changes 
in one country will spread to other countries'
5
. Kristin Forbes and Roberto Rigobon in their 
article 'No Contagion, Only Interdependence' (October 2002) defines contagion as 'a 
significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country (or group of 
countries)'. It is the degree to which asset prices or financial flows move together across 
markets after a turbulent period (after a financial shock) relative to the similar comovement in 
tranquil times. Cross-market linkages are the different ways in which different markets or 
economies are linked together. One example would be trade, which is a real cross-market 
linkage. These linkages can be  measured by different statistics such as correlation in asset 
returns, the probability of speculative attack or the transmission of shocks or volatility.  
 
Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens (August 2000) define contagion as ' the spread of market 
disturbances - mostly on the downside - from one country to the other, a process observed 
through comovement in exchange rates, stock prices, sovereign spreads and capital flows'. 
And according to Reinhart, Kaminsky, & Vegh (2003) in their article 'The unholy trinity of 
                                                          
5
 www.investopedia.com 
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financial contagion', this term is defined as 'an episode in which there are significant 
immediate effects in a number of countries following an event - that is, when the 
consequences are fast and furious and evolve over a matter of hours or days'. They further 
elaborate that only 'excess comovement' in financial and economic variables across countries 
in response to a common shock will constitute contagion. A separation is made between the 
terms contagion and spillover, the latter being identified as a situation where the initial 
international reaction to the news of a crisis will be muted, but gradual and protracted effects 
can emerge to cumulatively create major economic consequences.  
 
Even though significant research has been done, still there is no consensus among all 
economists on a universally accepted definition of contagion. Some argue that if a shock is 
transmitted from one country to another, it will constitute contagion even if there is no 
significant increase in cross-market relationships. Others dispute the fact that contagion can 
be defined based on simple tests of changes in cross-market linkages. It is their opinion that it 
is necessary to identify exactly how a shock is propagated across markets, and only certain 
transmission mechanisms constitute contagion; irrespective of its magnitude.  
 
Many academic papers related to contagion has often cited the works of Kristin Forbes and 
Roberto Rigobon. This thesis itself will be using the definition and theoretical model laid out 
by the two economists, which makes it important to look further into their work. In 
'Measuring Contagion' (Forbes & Rigobon, 2001), they introduce the term 'shift-contagions' 
instead of 'contagion' to differentiate their definition from other existing conceptions of the 
term. The term simply clarifies that contagion arises from a shift in cross-market linkages but 
avoids specifying how this shift occurs. The impact of the devaluation of Russian ruble on the 
Brazilian stock market and the impact of a stock market crash in the U.S. on the markets of 
Canada are the two example used to simplify their definition of contagion.  
 
When a crisis in one country is transmitted to another country, even without a significant 
change in cross-market relationships, some may argue that it constitutes contagion. But 
Forbes and Rigobon counter-argues that if two markets show a high degree of comovement 
during periods of stability, an increase in that relationship or the correlation  between two 
markets after a crisis in one market does not alone result in contagion. If the increase in cross-
market linkages is not significant, it is an instance high 'interdependence' between the two 
markets and not shift-contagion. According to the above classification, the decline in the stock 
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markets of Brazil after the Russian ruble crisis can be identified as contagion. Since U.S. and 
Canada have a high level of trade and other linkages between them (indicating that the two 
markets are highly correlated in all states of the world), the decline in Canadian stock markets 
due to a U.S. market crash cannot be easily identified as contagion. One need to look at the 
significance of the changes in cross-market linkages in order to determine whether it 
constitutes contagion or not.  
 
The definition 'contagion is a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to a 
single or group of countries' has empirical usefulness. This definition easily translates into a 
simple test of contagion, which is to test whether the cross-market correlations change 
significantly after a shock. Forbes and Rigobon have further identified three main advantages 
of using the same definition in proving their research. The fist advantage is related to 
international diversification. Under the expectation that  most economic disturbances are 
idiosyncratic, thus markets around the globe display relatively low correlation, international 
diversification is deemed to reduces portfolio risk and increases expected returns. Therefore, 
testing for contagion through correlation of assets markets can be a clear test of effectiveness 
of the international diversification strategy.  The second advantage is in its use in evaluating 
the role and potential effectiveness of international institutions and bailout funds. The final 
advantage is that provides a useful method of distinguishing between explanations of how 
shocks are transmitted across markets.  
3.1.3. Theories of Contagion  
 
There are various theories as to how contagion can occur, or more specifically,  how shock 
are propagated internationally.  These theories are broadly categorized in to two groups; 
crisis-contingent theories and non-crisis-contingent theories (Forbes & Rigobon, 2001). 
Crisis-contingent theories explain why transmission mechanisms change during a crisis and 
therefore why cross-market linkages increase after a shock to one entity. The crisis causes a 
structural shift, so that shocks are transmitted via a channel that does not exist in stable 
period. Evidence of shift-contagion is supported in these theories. Non-crisis contingent 
theories assume that transmission mechanisms remains constant during a crisis as well as a 
non-crisis period, and therefore cross-market linkages do not increase after a shock. This 
group of theories emphasize on spillovers that results from the normal interdependence 
among market economies. Interdependence means that shocks of either global or local in 
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nature are propagated across countries through their real and financial linkages, and such  
high comovement would not normally constitute contagion. Therefore, these theories of 
contagion provide evidence against contagion.   
 
Crisis-Contingent Theories 
Under the crisis contingent theories, there are three broad mechanisms of international 
propagation of shocks; 
 Multiple equilibria 
 Endogenous liquidity 
 Political economy 
Multiple equilibria occurs when the channel of transmission is investor psychology, where 
propagation of a shock is driven by the investors' expectations or beliefs, rather than by any 
real linkages. In other words, when a crisis rams one economy, investors change their 
expectations (which can also be triggered by a memory of past crises) and therefore transmits 
the shock through propagation mechanisms that does not exit during stable periods. 
Accordingly, contagion is said to transpire when a crisis in one economy causes the second 
economy to move from a good equilibrium to a bad one, characterized by a devaluation, a 
drop in asset prices, capital outflows, or debt default. Investors re-compute their priors on 
variables such as debt default, causing a downward movement in assets prices. This change in 
the prices of the second economy (relative to the change in the price of the first) is 
exacerbated during the shift of equilibriums.  
Endogenous liquidity theories of contagion can be identified as a portfolio re-composition. 
This channel only occurs after the initial shock to one market and is not present during 
periods of stability. A crisis in one economy can reduce the liquidity of market participants, 
which can force them to re-compose their portfolios and sell assets in other countries to 
continue operations in the said economy. In the same manner, if the liquidity shock is large 
enough, a crisis in one market could increase the degree of credit rationing and force investors 
to sell their holdings of assets in countries not affected by the initial crisis. It is important to 
understand that imperfect information or information asymmetries lead to an increased 
correlation of asset prices as well. If a financial crisis occurs in one country and it reflects and 
reveals weak fundamentals, investors may rationally conclude that similarly situated countries 
are also likely to face such problem. Therefore, uninformed investors are unable to distinguish 
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between a liquidity shock and a bad signal and thereby charge a premium where informed 
investors are the net sellers. As a result, informed investors can be hit by liquidity shocks that 
force them to sell their holdings. The high comovement between the asset prices that follows 
can lead to a situation of shock propagation through channels that did not exists previously.  
The final transmission mechanisms under this group of theories is political contagion. It is 
where contagion arise through political economies that have a greater impact in exchange rate 
regimes. For an example, one research studies the European devaluation of 1992 and 1998 
and develops a model that assumes that central bank presidents are under pressure to maintain 
their countries' fixed exchange rates. When one country decides to abandon its peg, this 
reduces the political costs to other countries of abandoning their respective pegs, which 
increases the likelihood of these countries switching exchange rate regimes (Dornbusch, Park, 
& Claessens, 2000).  
Rational or irrational behaviour of the investors and the incentive scheme for individual 
financial agents can cause contagion through channel that did not exist during periods of 
stability. Also, countries whose financial assets are widely traded in global markets and whose 
domestic financial markets are more liquid may be more vulnerable to financial contagion.  
 
Non-Crisis-Contingent theories 
Internationally propagated shocks that do not generate shift-contagion is grouped under non-
crisis-contingent theories. These transmission mechanisms or channels can be divided into 
four broad channels ; trade and financial linkages, policy coordination, country re-evaluation 
and random aggregate shocks.  
Local shocks in one country can affect the economic fundamentals of other countries through 
trade links and currency devaluations. For an example, any major trading partner of a country 
in which a financial crisis has induced a sharp currency depreciation, could experience 
declining asset prices and large capital outflows. Or they could become the target of a 
speculative attack as investors anticipate a decline in exports to the crisis country and hence a 
deterioration in the trade account. Consistent with their 'unholy trinity of contagion' 
proposition, Reinhart (et.al) highlights that financial linkages such as cross-border capital 
flows and common creditors (including the role of commercial banks in spreading an initial 
shock) are prominent in the theoretical explanation of contagion. Dorndusch (et.al) also 
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highlights financial links, namely where economic integration between markets involves both 
trade and financial links. Thus, a financial crisis in one country can lead to direct financial 
effects, including reductions in trade credits, foreign direct investment and other capital flows 
abroad.  
Policy coordination is the second transmission mechanism under discussion, and it creates a 
link between countries in a way that one country's response to an economic shock forces 
another country to follow suit. For an example, a trade agreement might include a clause in 
which lax monetary policy in one country can force other member countries to raise trade 
barriers.  
Country re-evaluation or learning explains the fact that investors may apply the lessons 
learned after a shock in one country, to other countries with similar macroeconomic structures 
and policies. For an example, if a country with a weak banking system is discovered to be 
vulnerable to a currency crisis, investors could reevaluate the strength of the banking system 
in other countries and adjust their expected probabilities of a crisis accordingly.  
Finally, it is suggested that random aggregate or global shocks could simultaneously affect 
the fundamentals of several economies. Studies have identified various global shocks that can 
trigger market adjustments in an international context. A common global cause, such as major 
economic shifts in industrial countries, a rise in the international interest rates and changing 
commodity prices as well as demand for commodities, can trigger crises in other economies. 
These can lead to comovement in assets prices or capital flows directly after the shock. 
The transmission channels described above are the 'real' linkages between markets, and it is 
assumed that after an initial shock, these mechanisms do not change significantly. If there is a 
large (but not significantly large) cross-market correlation after a shock, it is only a 
continuation of the linkages that existed before the crisis, not contagion.  
Reinhart (et. al 2003) identifies three key elements - an abrupt reversal in capital inflows, 
surprise announcements and a leveraged common creditors - is the 'unholy trinity' that 
distinguishes cases of contagion occurring across borders, to those not qualifying as 
contagion. They further emphasize that financial linkages and investor behaviour figure most 
prominently in the theoretical explanation of contagion.  
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3.1.4.  Measurement of Contagion 
 
According to Forbes and Rigobon (2001), the empirical literature that tests if contagion exists 
is more elaborate than the theoretical literate available on the subject. Four different 
approaches have been identified to measure the transmission of shocks and test for contagion; 
analysis of cross-market correlation coefficients, GARCH frameworks, cointegration and 
probit models.  
The test of contagion based on the cross-market correlation is a simple and straightforward 
measure. It estimates how two markets move together during periods of stability as well as 
turbulence. First, the correlation coefficient is calculated for the two markets under 
consideration for a relatively stable period. Then it is tested if the same correlation has 
significantly increased after one market experience a shock or crisis. If there is a significant 
increase of the correlation coefficient, it is taken as an indication that the transmission 
mechanisms between the two markets have strengthened, resulting in contagion.   
In the second method, test of contagion is carried out using a ARCH (Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity) or GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity) framework to estimate the variance-covariance transmission mechanism 
across countries. This approach estimates spillovers in volatility - that is, cross-market 
movements in asset prices. Most of the studies using various versions of these frameworks has 
found that market volatility is transmitted between countries. But they do not explicitly test if 
this propagation changes significantly after a shock, constituting contagion.  
Test of contagion through cointegration analyses for changes in the co-integrating vector 
between markets over long periods of time. The focus is on the long run relationship between 
markets instead of short-run changes after a shock. Downsides of using this method can be 
that focusing on long-term periods can cause the tests to miss brief periods of contagion. Also, 
some economists have performed these tests assuming that the real linkages between the 
markets remain constant over the entire period. If it is shown that co-integrating relationship 
increased over time, contagion would be identified, whereas it might only be a permanent sift 
in  cross-market linkages.   
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The final approach to testing contagion attempts to directly measure how different factors 
affect a country's vulnerability to financial crises. It uses simplifying assumptions and 
exogenous events to identify a model and directly measure changes in the propagation 
mechanism. The research involves estimating the probability of a crisis conditional on 
information on the occurrence of crisis elsewhere, taking into account fundamentals or 
similarities. Dornbusch(et.al) has given en example in his article on a research conducted by  
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996).  They have used a binary-probit model and a panel 
of quarterly macroeconomic and political data covering 20 industrial economies from 1959 
through 1993, show that the probability of a domestic currency crisis increases with a 
speculative attack on a currency elsewhere and that contagion is more likely to spread through 
trade linkages than through macroeconomic similarities (Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 
2000).  
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3.2  The Second Great Contraction of 2007-2008 
 
A financial recession or a financial crisis often has its grassroots in different economic and 
political factors moving together. In the global financial recession of  2007-2008, a domestic 
crisis in United States of America burst open a floodgate to the discrepancies in the global 
financial system. The financial crisis was triggered in the first quarter of 2006, when a gradual 
downturn began in the housing market of U.S. Even though this event was the most visible in 
the global crisis that unfolded, it proved to be only the tip of the iceberg. A complicated 
financial structure with cross-border linkages became the silent but the most lethal vehicle 
through which the crisis became propagated to every single aspect of the financial systems 
around the globe.  
3.2.1  Background to the crisis 
 
Monetary excess due to lax monetary policy  
Following the burst of the Internet Bubble of 2000, US Federal Reserve was determined to 
revive the economy and to prevent price deflation similar to Japan  in 1990's. They adopted a 
lax interest rate policy, where interest rates were record low levels(Figure 1). During the same 
time, a global imbalance was in creation. New capitalist societies were growing in China, 
India and Eastern Europe and they were emerging as fast developing invest and savings 
oriented nations. Countries like USA, Western Europe and Australia were consumer-oriented, 
promoting spending and debt. Capital flowed in to these markets from investment driven 
markets, making available a flood of excess funds. The availability of large capital inflows 
from abroad facilitated the low-interest environment in the U.S. economy. But it also resulted 
in a fundamental mispricing in capital markets, with implications of low credit spreads, a false 
belief low volatility and inflated risky assets. Even though interest rates were purposely kept 
at a minimum, it did not directly lead to an increase in inflation of goods and services prices. 
Rather, these years became a continuation of  The Great Moderation
6
, and this persistent 
macro-economic stability led many to believe that macro-economic risks had been 
significantly reduced. 
 
 
                                                          
6
 'The Great Moderation' is a period of low volatility in macroeconomics , mainly in output and inflation,  in USA 
and other major industrial countries. It is common consensus that the Great Moderation started in the 1980s 
and ended in 2007.  
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Figure 1: United States Benchmark Interest Rates from the period 2000-2006 
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com 
 
Leading up to a housing bubble 7 
 
Monetary excess created by lax monetary policies made high levels of funds or credit 
available in markets, mainly in forms of mortgage, consumer and corporate loans. Lending 
institutions like banks and financing corporations feasted on the flood of funds.  With interest 
rates were at a ground-level, these institutions were compelled to increase the number of loans 
granted in order to add to yield. Cheap credit was obtainable to consumers since banks and 
mortgage brokers offered teaser rates, no-documentation mortgages, piggyback mortgages (a 
combination of two mortgages that eliminates the need for a down payment) and NINJA ('No 
Income No Job or Assets) loans. New financial products offered the elimination/removal of 
the credit risk from banks' balance sheets (discussed in more detail later). This gave little 
incentive for banks to carry out stringent background checks to assess the credit worthiness of 
the borrower. Sub-prime lending
8
 became a major part of the overall mortgage finance 
market, where sub-prime loans grew from $35 billion on 1994 to $650 billion in 2007 
(Tashman, May 2007)  
 
 
                                                          
7
 In his working paper 'The financial crisis and the policy responses: an empirical analysis of what went wrong'  , 
prominent economist John B. Taylor discloses  he had found empirical evidence that the lax monetary policy 
during 2001-2003  was the main cause of the housing boom and the subsequent crash. 
 
8
 Sub-prime lending is where loans are granted to borrowers who have lower-than-average credit rating. The 
upfront and continuing cost of these types of loans are higher than that of prime lending. 
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Figure 2: Subprime mortgage market growth and Share of Total Mortgage Market 
 
Source : Tashman, (May 2007) 
 
The combination of cheap credit and low lending standards resulted in a housing frenzy. All 
mortgages were granted under the premise that housing prices can only increase and a 
borrower can always refinance a loan using the increased value of the house. A large number 
of American homeowners took out second  mortgages on their houses and new buyers flocked 
in to the real estate market. House prices soared and new home sales increased, which is 
evident from the graphs shown in Figure 03 and 04 below.   
 
Figure 3: U.S. Housing Price Index  
 
Source : Federal Reserve Economic Data(Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis) 
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Figure 4: New and Existing Home Sales (Period 1994 - 2014) 
 
Source: www.calculatedriskblog.com 
 
The New Finance Structure and Securitization  
For the last decade, financial markets have seen innovations like never before, with new 
forms of securitization and usage of derivatives being the most popular. It also saw changes in 
the banking strategies, originating from U.S.A and subsequently spreading to Europe and 
other markets. The traditional banking model operated in such a way that the specific bank 
who originates the loan, will hold it in their balance sheets until the loan has been repaid. It 
created an element of long term risk (from default)to the financial institution and  tied up 
capital and other resources as well. This system was then replaced by an "Originate and 
Distribute" model, in which loans are originated (for example residential mortgages), pooled, 
'tranched' and distributed via securitization  to other financial investors.  
 
Securitization is a process of transforming illiquid assets like real estate in to a security.  To 
further elaborate, banks would typically create 'structured' products, often referred to as 
collateralized debt obligations or CDOs (Figure 05 gives a basic understanding of selected  
terminology). Once the banks formed diversified portfolios, consisting of such products , they 
were 'sliced' or divided into different 'tranches'. Each tranche comes attached with its risks and 
benefits, where the 'super senior tranche' is known to be the safest tranche and 'equity tranche' 
is known as 'toxic waste' since it is the last in the payment pecking order. Each tranche is 
constructed to ensure a specific rating (E.g. AAA rating to the top tranche). These tranches 
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were then sold to financial and non-financial investors,  having varying appetites for risk. 
Banks managed to de-intermediate assets off their banks' balance sheets, even though in real 
terms, many of the securitized assets were held by conduits or 'special purpose vehicles' 
established  and controlled by those very banks.  
There was a substantial rise in popularity of securitized products or structured derivatives, 
since such financial engineering allowed banks to sell off mortgages and to release resources 
to provide more loans. It opened up the financial markets to investors and facilitated more 
loan to homeowners, where securitization ensured lower mortgage rates and lower interest 
rates on corporate and other types of loans. With banks facing only the 'pipeline risk' of 
holding loans for a couple of months, the lending standards became more lenient. Very little 
precaution was taken during the process of screening applications and monitoring loans, 
resulting in more and more credit being extended to those with subprime credit standings. 
Again, such a situation contributed to an unsustainable increase in assets prices, namely the 
housing bubble.  
Figure 5 : Explanation of technical terms 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) is an investment-grade security is backed by a 
diversified portfolio of mortgages, other types of loans (e.g. auto loans), corporate bonds and 
other assets like  credit card receivables. Collateralized Debt Obligation are similar in 
structure to Collateralized Mortgage Obligations(CMO) and Collateralized Bond 
Obligations(CBO). CDOs are generally called asset-backed commercial papers if the portfolio 
or package consists of corporate debt and mortgage-backed securities if the loans are 
mortgages.  
Mortgage Backed Securities are based on both prime mortgages and subprime mortgages 
and they can be secured by adjustable-rate mortgages or fixed rate mortgages. Prime 
mortgages are high quality mortgages made out to borrowers with high credit ratings and low 
default risk. They are eligible for purchase or securitization in the secondary mortgage 
market. Subprime mortgages are mortgages that are made out to borrowers who have low 
credit rating, meaning such borrowers are deemed to have a higher-than-average risk of 
defaulting on their loan. Lending institutions generally charge a higher interest rate as 
compared to prime mortgages, in order to compensate for the higher risk they themselves 
must bear. Investors in MBSs bear the risk of default on the original loan as well as the 
fluctuations of the interest rates.  
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3.2.2  Causes to the crisis 
 
Increase in mortgage defaults  
In the consumer driven economy of United States, individuals and corporate entities were 
enjoying the endless liquidity available at low rates and minimum  responsibility. Figure 06 
gives an indication how household debt has during the last decade.  
 
Figure 6: U.S. Household Debt Holdings and Values, 2001 to 2010 
 
Source: Report by Centre for Responsible Lending (U.S. - December 2012) 
 
Consumer debt as a fraction of house value has increased dramatically, from 56% in 1985 to 
68% in 2005 to 89% in late 2008 (Acharya & Richardson, 2009), all indicating that individual 
leverage was at a very high level. In 2005 and 2006,  interest rates began to climb steadily 
back to more normal levels, which is actually a market correction. Housing prices began to 
falter, which is again a correction to the over-pricing or over-valuation of the real 
assets(namely real estate). The substantial downturn in the housing market left the 
homeowners with mortgages that were essentially worthless. Since homes are the primary 
asset for most households, this led to a severe loss of household wealth. Highly leveraged 
homeowners found that they were unable to repay the mortgages when their introductory low-
level interest rates were reverted to regular rate. Most affected were those with insufficient 
credit strength, aka. subprime mortgage owners. Therefore, subprime mortgage defaults began 
to increased at the beginning of year 2007.  
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Pitfalls of the new system 
 
In the face of a collapsed housing market, structured financial products and securitization 
began to lose its glittery image.  When the probability of defaults increase,  the likelihood of 
significant credit losses on the tranches into which original mortgages have been sliced, will 
rise as well. This means that the credit risk on the senior tranches increases, often 
exponentially when housing market declines and interest rates increase. Since the subprime 
mortgage market was hit the hardest during the housing bubble burst, the lower tranches of 
CDOs and CMOs also began to suffer heavy losses. Most of the lower tranches were held by 
hedge funds, and also the process of securitization allowed hedge funds , money market and 
pension funds to indirectly hold assets that was previously prevented by regulatory 
requirements. With the subprime mortgage defaults leading to a loss of vale in their 
investments,  most of the hedge funds in the U.S. losing millions of dollars.  
 
In the meantime, banks were faced with a liquidity crisis. Traditionally, commercial banks 
financed  long term assets or long term loans with short-term deposits or on the basis of retail 
deposits. This maturity mismatch left the commercial banks exposed to funding liquidity risk , 
and a similar vulnerability was seen from the balance sheets of investment banks.  Banks were 
forced to rely more and more on short-term repurchase agreements or 'repos', and such a 
reliance on overnight financing required that the investment banks roll over a large part of 
their funding on  a daily basis. Dramatic decline in liquidity made the banking systems in 
developed worlds more vulnerable to decline in asset values and defaults.  
 
The rating agencies invariably contributed to the growth of a financial crisis. Credit agencies 
primarily rate the credit default risk of the assets to which they grant the particular rating. This 
was misinterpreted to mean that the rating covered market and liquidity risk as well. 
Structured products received more favourable ratings due to the fact that the assessment 
parameters of the agencies did not encompass the overall picture.  Also, they collected a 
higher fee for structured products. Combined with over-optimistic forecasts based on 
historically low mortgage default and delinquency rates, investors were led to believe that 
they are holding virtually risk-free tranches with high yields.  
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3.2.3  Unfolding of the crisis 
 
Summer of 2007 saw U.S. home loan lenders reporting declines in earnings, with  New 
Century Financial declared bankruptcy, the second largest subprime lender in U.S. along with 
American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. declaring bankruptcy. Rating agencies Moody's, 
Standard & Poor's and Fitch began to downgrade the credit ratings of tranches across U.S. 
subprime deals. This pushed down the prices of mortgage-related products and continued to 
unnerve the credit markets. One critical point in this unfolding calamity was the collapse of 
two highly leveraged hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns in June 20, 2007. These two 
hedge funds were heavily invested in subprime asset-backed securities. The falling prices of 
collateralized debt obligations saw the lenders of these fund demanding more collateral, with 
Merrill Lynch (one the fund's main creditors)  seizing their assets. Finally, Bear Stearns 
injected $3.2 billion worth of loans in to the fund to prevent more panic and fire sales.  
 
By this time, the crisis was slowly but surely spilling over the borders of the U.S. to other 
developed countries. In July 2007, a small bank in Germany, IKB, became the first European 
victim to the shock. Its conduit was unable to roll over asset-backed commercial paper and to 
provide the promised line. In the same time, the market for short term asset-backed 
commercial paper began to dry up, signaling that money market participants are becoming 
reluctant to lend to each other. Banks depend on the repo market, the federal funds and the 
interbank market in addition to short-term asset-backed commercial paper to fund themselves. 
Then came the announcement that tipped the scale; French bank BNP Paribas has frozen 
redemptions for three investments funds, citing its inability to value structured product. This 
caused the interbank markets to freeze up on August 9, 2007, causing the very first 'liquidity 
wave' . It resulted in the perceived default and liquidity risks of banks to rise significantly, 
driving up the LIBOR (Figure 45). 
 
The financial turmoil continued throughout 2007, punctured by margin calls, fire sales, 
downgrades, subprime lenders going bankrupt and quantitative hedge funds suffering losses 
in millions of dollars due to their exposure to subprime mortgage-backed securities. The 
Federal Reserve stepped in to mitigate the liquidity crunch by reducing the discount rate and 
injected funds to failing banks. Various sovereign wealth funds have invested a total of more 
than $38 billion in equity from November 2007 until mid-January 2008 in major U.S. banks 
(Brunnermeier, 2008) 
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Figure 7: LIBOR for the period 2005 - 2010 
 
Source : Federal Reserve Economic Data(Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis) 
 
2008 was not spared the crashing waves of the financial crisis, highlighted by the run on Bear 
Stearns, the fifth largest investment bank in U.S. and the subsequent rescue of it. They were 
heavily leveraged and exposed significantly to the subprime mortgage market. But since the 
company had more than 150 million trades spread across various counterparties, they were 
considered to be 'too interconnected' to be allowed to fail suddenly. The run on Bear Stearns 
on March 10, 2008 ended with the government of U.S.A intervening, by guaranteeing a total 
of $29 million for JP Morgan to purchase the troubled investment bank.  
 
Mortgage delinquency rates continued to grow in the following months, and in September 
2008  Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank in USA, collapsed. This event 
proved to be a critical turning point of the great recession, because banks lost faith in the 
value of securitization tied to the United States real estate market.  The collapse of Lehman 
Brothers came as a great shock because there was an implied assurance in the market that the 
government will always save crucial financial institutions from falling. But when the Treasury 
and Federal Reserve o decided not to act as a  guarantor in a bid takeover of Lehman 
Brothers, the market realized that no bank is 'too-big-to-fall'. In September 2008, Lehman 
Brothers declared bankruptcy, causing widespread panic in the entire financial intermediation 
system. Prime brokerage firms connected to Lehman Brothers, especially that in U.K. went 
bankrupt, and led to massive losses across many hedge funds. In the wake of this event, inter-
bank markets froze and stock markets reacted strongly around the globe.  
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Throughout the year 2008 and early 2009, the Federal Reserve of U.S. and the governments 
of other major markets announced various controls and facilities to regain market stability. 
Fund availability for private and public firms as well as local and state governments was 
curtailed. Government institutions who have invested in asset-based securities faced loss of 
wealth similar to individuals and corporate. The ongoing European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 
popularly known as the 'Eurozone Crisis', has its beginnings in the great financial crisis of 
2007-2008. A majority of businesses around the world revealed financial difficulties, and 
resulted in thousands of employees being made  redundant.  The economic, social and 
political impact of this crisis are immeasurable and very much present to this date. Complex 
and intense interconnectivity of the global financial system was the main channel of 
transmission of the domestic crisis in U.S. to the rest of the world.  
As a closing note, it should be noted that the Second Great Recession or Contraction of the 
world economy continues beyond the events stated above. But the boundaries of the thesis is 
identifying the event which is the clear catalyst for the shock in the selected market. 
Therefore, the leading causes as well as the most important happenings of the crisis were 
identified and discussed.  
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SECTION FOUR: METHOD OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
In any quantitative study, especially one using statistical modeling, it is important to clearly 
identify how boundaries of the specific problem have  been  defined, what is the theoretical 
foundation on which the study is based upon  and what kind of a procedure has been followed 
to carry out the study. The main purpose or the main problem of the thesis has already been 
defined as 'was there financial contagion during the financial crisis of 2007-2008?' 
An important pre-requisition for a solid investigation of contagion is to clearly identify the 
catalyst for the crisis. The reason is that the specific identification of the market in which the 
crisis is triggered, or the market where a domestic crisis was first triggered and then 
transmitted internationally, is an essential part of the statistical analysis.  From the analysis of 
the financial crisis of 2007-2008 in Section three, it is clear that the event that triggered the 
shock is the subprime mortgage crisis in United States. Therefore, the thesis will focus on 
whether there are contagious effect from  market volatility in the U.S to the countries of the 
chosen sample.  
The theoretical model used to evaluate whether contagion occurred between the U.S. and each 
of the other countries in the sample, was extracted from a  research papers published by 
Kristin Forbes and Roberto Rigobon (2002). These two economists follow a specific 
definition of contagion which facilitates the use of cross-market correlation in order to 
measure or to test for contagion. Since standard correlation measurement is influenced by 
volatility in market returns, it can provide inaccurate evidence of contagion. Therefore, an 
adjustment is made to the conditional correlation, which removes or corrects the volatility of 
returns stemming from the market in which the crisis is generated.  
This section describes the theoretical model that is utilized to test for contagion, and how it 
will be applied to two different types of asset returns; stock returns and government bond 
returns. A  description of the exact procedure followed or the exact methods used to measure 
contagion in the markets is laid out under 'Methodology'. The last part provides a details to 
the various pre-and post estimation tests performed on the data, especially focused towards 
vector autoregression model.      
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4.1 Theoretical Model 
 
Foundation for the quantitative analysis is the model presented by two economists attached to 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Kristin J. Forbes and Roberto Rigobon. Their 
paper 'No Contagion, Only interdependence; Measuring Stock Market Comovements' 
published in The Journal of Finance (Vol.LVII,No.5;October 2002) examines whether actual 
contagion has taken place in three significant financial crises during the last three decades. 
This section will discuss the findings of the article, along with the model extracted from it to 
be used in this thesis.  
As laid out in Section One, Forbes and Rigobon utilize 'a significant increase in cross-market 
linkages after a shock to one country (or a group of countries)' as the definition of contagion. 
There are certain empirical advantages in using such a definition, because it helps to narrow 
the area of study and focus it on a simple test for contagion. Out of different methods of 
measuring cross-market linkages, emphasis here is to test for contagion by evaluating the 
correlation in asset returns.  
When there is a shock in one market, the cross-market linkages can  increase and it can easily 
be identified as contagion. But it is important to look deeper into the relationship that exists 
between the two countries. If the two countries or two markets display a high degree of 
comovement during the relatively stable time period, an increase in cross-market linkages 
after a shock can just be a continuation of the same high level of relationship (refer the 
example of U.S. and Canada, pg. 21). Forbes and Rigobon use the term 'interdependence' 
describe the situation of an increase in cross-market correlations after a shock between two 
market that have strong linkages in all states of the world.  
The general method of testing for contagion using correlation is to first estimate the cross-
market correlation during the stable period and then compare it to the same estimate after a 
shock in one market. Afterwards, it is tested if the increase in correlation coefficients are 
significant. If the increase is significant, it is taken as an indication that the transmission 
mechanisms between the two markets have increased and therefore contagion has occurred. 
Few example are given for the various studies that have utilized this method, and most of 
them have found evidence of contagion in connection with several major crises.    
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The two authors argue that using the standard method of estimating the cross-market 
correlation is biased, giving an inaccurate interpretation of contagion. The standard definition 
of correlation, which is the Pearson's Correlation coefficient, is given below;  
    
             
    
                                                  (Equation 01) 
where x represents the  returns of the market in which the crisis or shock is triggered and y 
represents the returns from the second market under consideration. This equation can be also 
be written as; 
    
  
  
                                                                           (Equation 02) 
Using examples, the equations above are used to show how the correlation coefficient(ρ) is 
conditional on the variance (or the standard deviation σ) of market returns; specifically that of 
the market in which the shock is generated. As a result, the standard or the conditional cross-
market correlation increases when the market volatility increases, even though the actual 
linkages (represented by β in Equation 02) stays constant. This volatility in market return is 
identified as the heteroskedasticity bias, which renders the correlation coefficient inaccurate 
and biased upwards. An  increase in cross-market correlation can be due to a strengthening of 
cross-market linkages and /or due to market volatility. Therefore, in order to properly interpret 
whether there is actual contagion , cross-market correlations must first be adjusted for the 
heteroskedasticity in market returns.  
 
The correction of the bias using the factor of δ, is one of the most important aspects of the 
theoretical framework discussed in the paper. It is simply the relative increase in the variance 
of  market returns x from the stable period to the period after a crisis, noted as; 
 
    
         
      
         
                                                                                               (Equation 03) 
 
Using formal proof for justification, Forbes and Rigobon provides a formula for the 
conditional correlation as ; 
   ρ 
   δ
   δρ 
                                                                                                        (Equation 04) 
41 
 
where ρ* is the conditional correlation coefficient and ρ is the unconditional correlation 
coefficient.  
 
A simple algebraic rearrangement of equations 03 and 04 yields the unconditional correlation 
coefficient to be written as; 
  
  
              
                                                                  (Equation 05) 
 
Applying the models or the equations presented above, Forbes and Rigobon carry out tests for 
contagion on three major financial crises. From the data derived from stock markets of a wide 
sample of countries, they study the 1997 Asian Crisis, 1994 Mexican devaluation and the 
1987 U.S. market crash. Both the conditional and unconditional correlation coefficients are 
calculated for each crisis and it is tested if the increase in correlations after a shock is 
significant by using a one-sided t-test.  It is found that while applying the conditional 
correlation, many countries show evidence of contagion; and after  correcting for the bias of 
market volatility, hardly any evidence of contagion was shown.  
The quantification and adjustment for the heteroskedasticity bias has its validation based on 
two assumptions; absence of omitted variables and no endogeneity between markets. In other 
words, it is assumed that there are no exogenous global shocks and there aren't any exogenous 
feedback from stock market y to stock market x. As discussed under the literature review on 
contagion, random or aggregate global shocks like a contraction in the international supply of 
capital or a decline of global demand for commodities, can cause cross-market correlation 
between markets to increase after an economic shock. Therefore, such a change to the 
fundamental linkages between countries are assumed to be non-existent. Further analysis of 
impact of relaxing these two assumptions is presented in the article under discussion.  
An important requirement in carrying out tests for contagion using the above theoretical 
model is that certain criteria for validation or near identification has to be fulfilled. First, it 
should be possible to clearly identify from which country the shock has been generated. In 
other words, which country has triggered the shift in market volatility. Secondly, the shift or 
the increase in market volatility should be large. And finally, the relevant country or the crisis 
country should be included as one market in the estimation of correlations.  
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4.2  Approach to the Problem 
 
The main problem of the thesis, as laid out in Section one, is to identify whether contagion 
occurred during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. To be more specific, the study will 
concentrate whether contagion occurred in the stock market and government bonds market 
during the financial crisis. Theoretical model explained above will be applied to both markets, 
and thereby the adopted measurement method of contagion is the cross-market correlation in 
stock market returns and government bond market returns.  
First, it is important to ascertain whether three prerequisites for the validation of the model, or 
the near identification criteria can be fulfilled. The most important requirement is a clear 
identification of the market/country in which the shock was generated or the crisis began. 
From the details in Section Three, it is fairly obvious that the subprime mortgage crisis in the 
U.S. was the catalyst of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Therefore, the United States is 
defined as the market in which the crisis was triggered, and contributed towards market 
volatility. The second criteria is that the shift in market volatility should be substantial. This 
fact can be observed in most of the datasets, which will be discussed in coming sections. The 
final requirement is crisis country should be included as an integral part of the correlation 
calculations. It means that the thesis will evaluate the contagious effects from the U.S. to each 
of the countries in the selected sample.  
The approach to the problem have several steps. First, the conditional(standard) correlation 
coefficient is estimated for each pair of countries in the sample as per Equation 01. The U.S. 
will be the fixed element in every single pair of countries evaluated. Correlation is estimated 
between returns for the specific market(stock or government bonds), for each pair of 
countries, for three specified periods. A test of significance is then carried out on each of the 
cross-market correlation coefficients to evaluate if the change in correlations between the 
periods (as specified in the hypothesis) is significant. If it is, there is evidence of contagion.  
An assessment is then carried out on the heteroskedastic bias, created by the volatility in 
returns within the markets of the U.S. Having estimated the adjustment factor for this bias 
using Equation 03, the unconditional cross-market correlation is calculated in the same 
procedure as the conditional correlation. A test of significance is carried out in order to 
determine if contagion has taken place.  
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4.3  Methodology Of Statistical Analysis 
 
Different techniques or methods have been chosen to implement the above approach, which 
are: a vector autoregression (VAR) method, a simple bivariate analysis and a multiple 
variable regression or analysis.  With regard to application in the stock market, all three 
techniques are used, while in the government bonds market, a bivariate analysis is not carried 
out.  
4.3.1  VAR Analysis 
 
The vector autoregression (VAR)  method has more emphasis in the quantitative analysis. 
Considering that it is a model which became more popular in the last three decades, special 
attention has been given to explore many elements connected to a VAR analysis.  
According to the methodology adopted by Forbes and Rigobon,  a VAR analysis is carried out 
to obtain a variance-covariance matrix. Afterwards, this matrix is used to calculate the cross-
market correlation coefficients between each pair of countries for the three different time 
periods. The same technique is adopted in this quantitative study, where a regression based 
analysis of the data is performed using a VAR (vector autoregression) framework. It was 
elected to have five lags within the regression and therefore all the lagged values of the 
market returns in U.S. and the other country in a pair are considered as the regressors. VAR is 
performed for each dataset (where U.S. is the fixed element in each pair) for each of the three 
periods (stable, crisis and full) specified in the following sections. A variance-covariance 
matrix is then derived from each of the regressions, and this matrix provides the variance of 
each coefficient estimate (of each regressor) and the covariance between them.  
These parameters are then used to calculate the conditional cross-market correlations, the 
adjustment factor and then the unconditional cross-market correlation. Since market volatility 
is caused by the crisis generated in the U.S., the adjustment factor (Equation 03) or the 
correction to the standard correlation coefficient is estimated using the variance of returns in 
the U.S stock/government bond market. It is important to remember that the correlation  is 
calculated between the coefficients of each regressors and not for each variable directly. An 
inference is drawn about the behaviour of the variables through the interactions and the 
standard error of the coefficient estimates.  
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Once cross-market correlations (both conditional and unconditional) are calculated, each one 
of them are tested for significance. The hypothesis formulated to test for significance is to 
compare the correlation coefficient during the crisis period with that of the full period. More 
specifically, the test hypothesis is; 
H0 : ρ >   
  
H1 :       
  
If the z-statistic is higher in absolute value to the critical value of 1.65 at 5% significant level, 
the null hypothesis is rejected and it is considered as statistical evidence that contagion have 
taken place.   
Treatment of interest rates 
Interest rates have been included in the above regression in order to control for aggregate 
shocks in the market as well as any monetary policy coordination. Even though it is not by far 
a perfect measure, interest rates can be used as a reasonable proxy to any global shifts in real 
economic variables and/or policies that affect stock market performance. Therefore, the three-
month interbank rates for each pair of countries has been utilized as exogenous variables
9
 in a 
VAR analysis(E.g. in the analysis between U.K. and U.S., interbank interest rates of these two 
countries are included in the regression as exogenous variables). The possibility of including 
interest rates as endogenous variables was considered. But a trial analysis rendered the VAR 
estimations complicated and the results did not deviate significantly from those obtained by 
including interest rates as exogenous variable.  
Tools needed for the  quantitative analysis 
Given the magnitude of data as well as the requirement to run vector autoregression analyses 
for several pairs of countries for different time periods, it was a formidable task to carry out 
individual regressions. Data was gathered, transformed and mined using the Excel software, 
but it was not a sufficient tool to run advanced regressions such as VAR. Therefore, it became 
a necessity to learn the basic operations of  the statistical software program STATA. The 
command-based  statistical software was utilized to carry out VAR analysis as well as the 
bivariate and multiple regressor analysis. Pre- and post-estimation tests which are discussed in 
length later in this section were also performed using STATA.  
                                                          
9
 An exogenous variable is independent from the states of the other variables in the model.  
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4.3.2   Bivariate and multiple regression models 
 
As a control measurement or for sensitivity testing, a simple bivariate analysis was also 
carried out to test for contagion using cross-market correlation. Unlike the VAR analysis, the 
variance will be observed for each variable and the covariance between the variables are used 
to arrive at the correlation. The equation;  
Yt = α + Xt + ut   
is used, where  Xt or the independent variable is U.S. stock market returns while Yt or the 
dependent variable is the stock market returns in the other country in a specific pair of 
countries. Similar to the VAR analysis, the conditional and unconditional correlation 
coefficients (for each pair of countries and for each of the three periods) were calculated and 
subsequently tested for significance using the z-statistic.  
With regard to the analysis carried out in the stock markets, the bivariate equation is then 
extended to include all the lagged values of the two variables as predictors. This multiple 
regressor model is essentially the first part of the VAR equation, only with the analysis using 
the covariance between the variables themselves instead of the coefficient estimates of the 
variables. Such an analysis was carried out to ascertain there will be a significant impact on 
the test results. The similar procedure as the bivariate analysis is carried out, sans the 
extensive pre-and-post estimation tests in the VAR model.  
A similar multiple regression analysis is carried out on the government bond market, with the 
bonds returns in the second country as the dependent variable, and bond returns in the U.S. as 
well as the three-months interbank lending rates(for both countries in a pair) are taken to be 
the independent variables. Conditional and unconditional correlations are separately estimated 
and tested for significance to determine whether contagion has taken place in the government 
bonds market.  
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Hypothesis testing  
As mentioned above, the simple calculation of cross-market correlations and observation of 
its increase after a shock is insufficient when determining whether contagion has occurred. 
Once a crisis is generated in one market, the asset returns react to such a situation, obvious 
through market volatility. When the variance of returns increase so does the correlation 
coefficient between the two markets under consideration. What constitutes contagion is a 
'significant' increase between cross-market linkages when a crisis occurs. 
The test hypothesis to test for significance is; 
H0 : ρ >   
  
H1 :       
  
where ρ is the correlation coefficient during the full period, and   
  is the correlation figure 
during the crisis period. An application of the simple one sided t-test was problematic and 
therefore it was necessary to formulate a method to quantify this 'significance'. Thus, the 
Fisher's Z-transformation is used to compare two correlation coefficients and to determine the 
significance level. This method converts the standard Pearson's correlation coefficient in to a 
normally distributed variable 'z'.  
z-statistic = 
     
       
 
where z0 and z1 are the transformed values of the two correlation coefficients using the Fisher 
z-transformation method. For an example, z0 is estimated using the equation ; 
    
 
 
   
   
   
 
where it has a known standard error of; 
       
 
    
 
and n0 is the number of observations in related correlation calculation. The one -sided z-
statistic  is then compared with the critical value of the 5% significance level which is 1.65. 
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4.4  Key Concepts 
 
Vector Autoregression  
Vector autoregression (VAR) was first introduced to economics by the econometrician and 
macro-economist Christopher Sims in 1980.  This model of analysis proved to be one of the 
most successful, flexible and easy to use models of multivariate time series analysis. It is a 
natural extension of the univariate autoregressive model to dynamic multivariate time series. 
VARs is successfully used for forecasting as well as for analyzing causal relationships among 
economic and financial time series variables. There are three types of VARs; reduced-form 
VARs, recursive VARs and structural VARs (SVAR).  
A vector autoregression with two time series variables, Yt and Xt consists of two equations: In 
one, the dependent variable is Yt  and in the other equations, the dependent variable is Xt. The 
regressors in both equations are lagged values of both variables. A VAR extends the 
univariate autoregression to a 'vector' of time series variables. When the number of lags in 
each of the equations is the same and is equal to p, the system of equations is called a 
VAR(p). For an example, in the case of two time series variables Yt and Xt, with two lagged 
values for each variable, the VAR(2) consists of the two equations; 
Yt = β10 +  β11Yt-1 + β12Yt-2  + γ11Xt-1 + γ12Xt-2 + u1t 
Xt = β20 +  β21Yt-1 + β22Yt-2  + γ21Xt-1 + γ22Xt-2 + u2t 
where the β's and the γ's are unknown coefficients and the u1t  and u2t are error terms. As an 
illustration, considering the pair of countries U.S. and U.K., Xt  would be the stock market 
return in U.S. while Yt  is the returns in U.K 
 
The coefficients of a VAR are obtained by estimating each equation by the OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares) method. Under the VAR assumptions, the OLS estimators are consistent and 
have a normal distribution in large samples. Accordingly, statistical inferences are normal and 
hypothesis testing including joint hypotheses that involve restrictions across multiple 
equations, is possible. It is important to ensure that the variables in the analysis are plausibly 
related to one another, because too many variables having unjustifiable relationships can 
introduce estimation errors without any predictive content. In the same way, using an 
appropriate lag length is important for a VAR to be stable and consistent.  
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Variance-covariance matrix 
A variance-covariance matrix (also known as covariance matrix or a dispersion matrix) is a 
matrix whose element in the i, j position is the covariance between the i th and j th elements 
of a random vector (that is, of a vector of random variables). In a simple definition, 
covariance measures the degree to which two variables change or vary together. If the  
covariance of two random variables (E.g. Xi, Xj) are considered, it can be mathematically 
represented as ; 
cov(Xi , Xj) = E[(Xi - μi)( Xj - μj)] 
where μi is the expected value of Xi and μj is the expected value of Xj. This relationship can be 
further generalized in to a multivariate situation and for estimated coefficients in a regression 
analysis. In such a variance-covariance matrix, the variance of each parameter estimate (i.e. 
each βˆ) as well as the covariance between each coefficient is explicitly represented using a 
matrix notation. The diagonal of the matrix shows the variance of the coefficients estimates, 
which is the square of the standard errors. The matrix written as; 
 
is essentially the covariance or variance-covariance matrix. 
 
Heteroskedasticity 
In statistics, heteroskedasticity arises when the standard deviations of a variable, monitored 
over a specific amount of time, are non-constant. Under the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
OLS estimators remain unbiased. But the standard error and the coefficient variance of the 
OLS estimators (variance of the coefficients) will be biased. In assets prices such as in stocks 
and bonds, conditional heteroskedasticity is visible, indicating that market volatility(giving 
rise to non-constant variances) causes the correlation coefficient to be bias.  
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4. 5  Pre-and-Post Estimation Tests 
 
Tests described in this subsection were performed to ensure stationarity of data,  to assess  
ways of filtering data as well as any exclusion of results and many other stability factors. 
Performance of these tests has largely attempted to ensure that the results derived from vector 
autoregression method were subject to rigorous validation and to prevent any statistical 
shortcomings.  
4.5.1  Data transformation and testing for unit root 
 
In the analysis of time series data, it is important to investigate the stationarity of the data. A 
strict definition of stationarity is that it is a stochastic process whose joint probability 
distribution does not change when shifted in time, displaying a constant mean and variance in 
addition. Since the practical application of this definition is difficult, a 'weaker' definition of 
stationarity is adopted when time series data is used for empirical studies.  
It is important to identify if the data or the regressors of the regression contains a stochastic 
trend, since  a stochastic trend indicates a unit root is present in the data. This can cause the 
ordinary-least squares(OLS) estimators the t-statistic to have a nonstandard distribution. 
Therefore, a  unit root test using an autoregressive model is carried out to assess whether the 
time series variable is non-stationary. One of the well known unit root test is the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, used for larger and more complicated sets of time series models as 
opposed to the Dickey-Fuller test.  The null hypothesis of a unit root presence is tested, and it 
will be rejected if the negative ADF test statistic is more negative compared to different levels 
of confidence.    
Since it is important that the time series data used in a vector autoregression analysis be 
stationary, the data used in the quantitative study has been transformed to the first difference 
of the returns' natural logarithm. Afterwards, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was 
run for every single data set to ensure there is no unit root in the data and that it is stationary.  
Figure 08 displays the unit root test conducted for the (transformed) stock market returns in 
United Kingdom for the full period under consideration. Since the test statistic is negative 
19.278 and much lower than the statistics in the main three levels of significance, the null 
hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected and the data can deemed to be stationary.   
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Figure 8 : The Augmented Dickey Full test for the stock market returns of U.K. (Period 1 
January 2005 to 31 March 2009) 
 
 
4.5.2  Selection of the appropriate lag length 
 
A vital step in conducting a VAR analysis is that the regression has an appropriate number of 
lags. A lagged value is simply a later point of time in a time series; if t is the present date, then 
the lag of one would be t-1,which would be yesterday. Too many lags can increase estimation 
uncertainty, while too little can affect the estimation accuracy due to valuable information 
being lost. There are various tests used to identify the number of lags, most of which are 
included in the STATA software.  According to the magnitude of data, a recommendation of 
the lag number is given using approaches such as; 
 the log of the likelihood function(LL) 
 A likelihood-ratio test statistic followed by it degrees of freedom and p-value (LR, df and 
p) 
 Four information criteria tests of FPE(Akaike's final prediction error), AIC (Akaike's 
information criterion), HQIC (Hannan and Quinn's information criterion) and SBIC 
(Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion) 
Figure 09 shows appropriate lag length selected by the different methods or tests. The test was 
performed on the (transformed) stock market returns in United Kingdom for the full period 
under consideration. A star('*') indicates the recommended  number of lags according to the 
magnitude of data.  
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)            -19.278            -3.960            -3.410            -3.120
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =      1539
. dfuller fdLNrUK, trend lags(10)
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Figure 9: Lag selection test for the VAR analysis between stock market returns of U.K. and U.S.  
(Period 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2009) 
 
The results from the tests indicate that the most appropriate number of lags to be included in 
the vector autoregression is 14 or more.  Such a high number of lag can render the regression 
analysis too complicated and cause a high estimation error.  Since lags are used control for 
serial correlation and control for any variation in trading patterns during a five day trading 
week, it was ultimately decided to use five lags for each variable in the VAR method as well 
as the multiple regression analysis (for stock markets).  
4.5.3  Granger Causality Test 
 
The sheer amount of quantitative analysis from the VAR was overwhelming and it became a 
necessity to explore possible ways to exclude certain results and to filter the data. One way 
was to apply the Granger causality test on the regressors and to find out if the variables 
Granger cause one another other. The Granger causality test  is the test of a null hypothesis 
that the coefficients on all the values of a variable (E.g. xt-1 , xt-2,.... xt-k) are zero. This null 
hypothesis implies that these regressors have no predictive content for Yt beyond that 
contained in the other regressors (Stock & Watson, 2007).  
    Exogenous:  fdintUSA fdintUK  _cons
   Endogenous:  fdrUK fdrUSA
                                                                               
    15    11347.9  6.6616    4  0.155  1.4e-09  -14.6995  -14.6141    -14.47   
    14    11344.5  86.603*   4  0.000  1.4e-09* -14.7004* -14.6202* -14.4848*  
    13    11301.2  24.871    4  0.000  1.5e-09  -14.6492  -14.5741  -14.4475   
    12    11288.8  49.283    4  0.000  1.5e-09  -14.6382  -14.5683  -14.4504   
    11    11264.2  22.968    4  0.000  1.5e-09  -14.6113  -14.5466  -14.4375   
    10    11252.7  73.388    4  0.000  1.6e-09  -14.6015   -14.542  -14.4416   
     9      11216  92.438    4  0.000  1.6e-09  -14.5589  -14.5046  -14.4129   
     8    11169.8  113.31    4  0.000  1.7e-09  -14.5039  -14.4548  -14.3718   
     7    11113.1  94.142    4  0.000  1.8e-09  -14.4353  -14.3913  -14.3171   
     6      11066  168.88    4  0.000  2.0e-09  -14.3792  -14.3404  -14.2749   
     5    10981.6  45.133    4  0.000  2.2e-09  -14.2744  -14.2407   -14.184   
     4      10959  456.66    4  0.000  2.2e-09  -14.2502  -14.2217  -14.1737   
     3    10730.7  169.53    4  0.000  3.0e-09  -13.9579  -13.9346  -13.8953   
     2    10645.9  693.89    4  0.000  3.3e-09  -13.8527  -13.8346   -13.804   
     1      10299  363.04    4  0.000  5.2e-09  -13.4058  -13.3929  -13.3711   
     0    10117.5                      6.5e-09  -13.1745  -13.1668  -13.1537   
                                                                               
   lag      LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
                                                                               
   Sample:  1/17/2005 - 3/31/2009               Number of obs      =      1535
   Selection-order criteria
. varsoc fdrUK fdrUSA, maxlag(15) exog(fdintUSA fdintUK)
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Certain empirical research use 'Granger causality' to show the result of exclusion tests in a 
bivariate VAR (e.g. returns of U.S. and returns of Canada) or a multivariate VAR ( taking into 
account all the lagged values of variables defined in the regression. But it should not be used 
in isolation, more qualitative information or facts should be used in connection with the test to 
interpret the results (Becketti, 2013). 
Figure 10 below shows the results of the Granger causality test , performed on the dataset 
containing stock market returns from U.S. and the U.K for the full time period. It is tested 
whether the returns in the U.S. 'Granger causes' returns in the U.K. and vice versa. The p-
value shown in the last column can be compared with a significance level of 1%, 5% or 10%.  
Figure 10: Granger Causality test for the VAR analysis between stock market returns of U.K. and 
U.S.  (Period 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2009) 
 
It is obvious that the p-value is considerably significant between both causality assumptions, 
meaning each variable has a certain causality on each other . Therefore this method cannot be 
justifiably used to filter the number of observation generated from the regression analysis. 
Therefore, assumption of no endogeneity as stated in the theoretical model is enforced, 
meaning that there is no feedback from market y to market x. Given the size and structure of 
the U.S. economy, it is safe to assume that impact of the market activities of U.S on other 
countries is much larger compared to the impact from those markets to the U.S. economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      
               fdrUSA                ALL    43.594     5    0.000     
               fdrUSA              fdrUK    43.594     5    0.000     
                                                                      
                fdrUK                ALL    193.95     5    0.000     
                fdrUK             fdrUSA    193.95     5    0.000     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
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SECTION FIVE: APPLICATION TO THE STOCK MARKET 
 
Section five provides the details of the quantitative study carried out in order to asses if 
contagion occurred in the stock markets of sample countries, stemming from the crisis in the 
U.S. economy. The sample selection and the data used for the statistical analysis are laid out 
before moving on to the results obtained when testing for contagion in stock market returns.  
5.1  The Sample  
Even though the financial crisis of 2007-2008 has had an impact on practically every market 
around the world, it was chosen to narrow the data analysis to a sample of nine countries; the 
G8 countries and Norway. Considering that the country in which the crisis originated is one 
member of the G8, it was interesting to see how the crisis would affect its  main trade 
partners. 
The G8 or the  'Group of Eight' is an international forum consisting of the world's wealthiest 
countries. It is made up of the heads of governments from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. At its inception in 
1975, the group's original countries consisted of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom and the United States. These countries were later joined by Canada in 1976 and 
Russia in 1998. The European Union is also represented at meetings by both the president of 
the European Commission and the leader of the country that has European Union presidency.    
U.S. and the European Union members of G8 
Before the subprime mortgage crisis, the United States was an active investor in the global 
share market, where investors held more than $5 million in foreign assets. Their largest 
investment market was the United Kingdom (accounting for nearly 18 percent of the UK 
stock capitalization) followed by Germany (15%) and France (12%) (Shirai, 2009). 
Meanwhile, United Kingdom and Europe were the most active foreign investors when it came 
to the U.S. stock market as well as the debt securities market. For an example, UK was in the 
forefront holding $421 billion worth stocks in U.S. as of June 2007. Compared to Asian 
investors, most of the European investors were risk-takers, investing heavily in corporate and 
asset-backed securities in the U.S. financial market.  
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Cross-border banking has also expanded over time , with banks having claims in other banks 
and its affiliated banks operating abroad as well as in non-bank institutions through loans, 
corporate bonds, ABs, MBS and CDOs. Banks with American nationality were heavily  
involved in  international banking activity by establishing branches and subsidiaries in the UK 
and other European markets.  
With a background of such intense connectivity between the U.S. and the European G8 
members, the impact of the subprime mortgage crisis had an obviously strong repercussions 
within the group of countries. Many banks saw the immediate deterioration of their assets, 
resulting in a fast impairment of their capital. For an example, IKB Deutsche Industriebank 
AG ('IKB) in Germany, who provides credit to small and medium sized companies, became 
the first European bank to declare financial trouble in July 2007. In 9 August 2007, BNP 
Paribas, France’s largest bank, halted redemptions on three investment funds that held assets 
backed by U.S. subprime mortgage debt. Overnight interest rates in Europe increased as a 
direct consequence. The European Central Bank immediately responded with the largest 
short-term liquidity injection in its 9 year history, with €94.8 billion ($130 billion at the time) 
worth of overnight repos. And then Northern Rock, the United Kingdom’s fifth-largest 
mortgage lender, fell victim to the first bank run in the United Kingdom in September 2007, 
even though Bank of England provided liquidity support. Bank write-downs and bankruptcy 
threatened the financial systems in U.K and European countries due to their exposure to the 
structured credit assets or structured financial products like asset-backed securities.   
 
U.S. and Japan 
Nearly 12% of Japan's stock capitalization consists of U.S. financial products, even though 
the Japanese investors prefer  to follow a relatively conservative role,  with more investment 
in secure low-risk assets offered by the U.S financial market. With regard to banking 
activities, general data shows that the banks of Japan were not significantly involved  in the 
global intermediation of funds. Therefore, Japan suffered relatively less bank write-downs and 
loss of financial value compared to its European counterparts in the G8 forum. Factors such as 
a large pool of household savings(opposed to U.S.'s consumer driven households), dominancy 
of commercial banks over other financial institutions like investment banks, caution about 
foreign investment and the absence of a major real estate bubble dampened an acute level of 
repercussions from the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis.   
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U.S. and Russia 
Russia is not integrated in to the global financial system as the other members of the G8 
group.  When the crisis began in U.S., the oil-rich nation was confident that they will not be 
severely affected as most of the other industrialized and developed countries. With a hefty 
$560 billion in reserves, a GDP of 7 percent during the previous years and a stable Russian 
ruble,  the country did not feel immediate effects of the subprime mortgage crisis in U.S. But 
a significant drop in world oil prices proved to be a that was the main factor that sent Russian 
stock markets plunging in 2008. The commodities markets, dominated by automation and 
metal started to feel the effects of reduced global demand once the financial crisis became 
more severe. Construction and retails firms were suffering due to their exposure in the credit 
market. Two major banks were taken over by state-run institutions, which put a heavy stress 
on the national Stabilization Fund. Still, Russia did not necessarily suffer similar 
consequences like it's G8 counterparts, thanks to a strong oil production sector and market 
deregulation to maintain some stability. But it is not by any means a statement that the old 
World Super power escaped unscathed.  
 
U.S. and Canada 
Due to the close geographical proximity between the United States and Canada, they enjoy a 
healthy relationship through trade and financial links. Canada currently stands as the number 
one country with whom U.S. trades, with an year to date as at April 20013 trade volume 
amounting to US$ 209 billion
10
. Therefore it is natural that the domestic crisis in the  
subprime mortgage market in U.S. is transmitted to Canada through various channels. 
Recession came relatively late to Canada but nonetheless, it's impact was significant with the 
credit defaults, unemployment, decline in manufacturing sectors and exports as well as a fall 
in the GDP. Unlike its European counterparts, Canada seems to be in a better position to 
weather the storm with a strong banking system, an effective policy response and a relative 
low debt/GDP ratio (Campbell, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/current/balance 
56 
 
U.S. and Norway 
Although Norway is neither a member in the G8 nor the European Union, it is associated to 
the group through the membership in European Economic Area. This Scandinavian country 
was intriguing to many economists over the relatively modest impact the international 
financial crisis has had on the country's economy.  
 
Before the period of global financial turmoil, Norway experienced a period of economic 
stability and healthy activity. Low interest rates and low levels of inflation encouraged 
spending and housing sales were in the rise with the availability of low cost credit. This 
eventually led to a drastic increase in real estate prices, resulting in a bubble in the real assets 
sector. A fall of more than 14 percent was recorded between August 2007 to December 2008, 
until it's recovery in 2009
11
. The stock market bore the brunt of the crisis transmission, with 
the price index collapsing by nearly 64 percent in six months from May 22nd till November 
20th 2008. Even though these events took place, Norway managed to act quickly by 
implementing a countercyclical policy such as increasing demand through interest rate cuts 
and expanding the fiscal stimulus. A close regulation of the banking sector, controlling of 
unemployment and a substantial sovereign fund consisting of oil industry revenue all 
contributed towards Norway being heralded as the only western industrialized country to 
survive the financial crisis of 2008 generally unharmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Extracted from the discussion paper 'A Chronology of Financial Crises for Norway' by Ola Honningdal Grytten 
and Arngrim Hunnes (Business School, Department of Economics, May 2010) 
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5.2. The Data  
In order to carry out the quantitative analysis for contagion in the stock market., data for 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Russia, U.K. and the U.S. is collected from 
Datastream. Table 01 shows the stock market index considered for each country.  
Table 1: Stock market indices for data extraction 
COUNTRY INDEX DATASTREAM CODE 
Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index TTOCOMP(PI) 
France CAC 40 Index FRCAC40(PI) 
Germany DAX 30 Index DAXINDX(PI) 
Italy FTSE MIB Index FTSEMIB(PI) 
Japan Nikkei 225 Index JAPDOWA(PI) 
Norway OSE All Share Index OSLOASH 
Russia RTS Index RSRTSIN(PI) 
United Kingdom FTSE 100 Index FTSE100(PI) 
United States S&P 500 Composite Index S&PCOMP(PI) 
 
Data is obtained in a non-synchronized manner, using the closing market price of each 
index
12
. The daily returns are estimated using the US Dollar value of each stock market index 
and the stock market's rate of return in country i  in day t  is calculated as; 
Ri,t =  ln (Pi,t / Pi,t-1)  
Many economic (time series) data exhibits trends, meaning  it tends to grow over the long run, 
while the standard deviations of many time series  is approximately proportional to its level. 
However, the log of a time series grows linearly and therefore the log of the standard 
deviation is approximately constant. As explained by the previous section, transforming data 
into first difference of the natural logarithm for each variable greatly reduced the trends and 
made the data stationary. Furthermore,  a two-day moving average is calculated for the 
                                                          
12
 A working paper by Mardi Dungey and Abdullah Yalama (May 2010) tests for contagion based on a non-
synchronized dataset of closing market prices and a synchronized dataset for which market prices are extracted 
on a specific point of time. They find that changing from the non-synchronized to synchronized data does not 
greatly affect the conclusions of the testing methodology by Forbes and Rigobon.   
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transformed data to control for the fact that markets in different countries are open during 
different hours as well as non trading days such as weekends and public holidays
13
. 
For the quantitative study of the crisis based on cross market correlation, it was necessary to 
identify the period in which markets showed relatively constant activity. Afterwards, it was 
important to demarcate the period in which the crisis first began and created volatility in the 
markets. From timeline of the crisis analysed earlier, it was determined that the period  
between 1 January 2005 and 30 March 2009 will be the full time period for which data will be 
gathered. As highlighted in Section 3.2 , the crisis in U.S. first comes to head in June 2007 
with the collapse of two highly leveraged hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns. Soon 
afterwards, the money market dried up in August 2007 creating a liquidity crisis in the global 
market. Another critical point was the Lehman brother collapse in September 2008, which 
was often cited as the event that sent the financial markets declining.  Stock markets show a 
significant dip during the latter part of 2008 but show a recovery during the first quarter of 
2009.  
From the events, it is identified that the stable period is to be from 1 January 2005 to 31 May 
2007,  while the period from 1 June 2007 to 31 March 2009 will be the period of turmoil in 
the markets(Refer the volatility peaks in the graph from Figure 08). In order to carry out 
cross-market correlation, daily stock market returns are calculated for each of the three 
periods defined above (i.e. stable, crisis, full), for each of the eight sets of countries (E.g. US 
and Canada, US and France, etc.) 
Figure 11: S&P 500 Volatility Index for the period 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2009 
source: www.yhoo.com/finance 
 
                                                          
13
 Herewith, the term 'returns' will refer to the transformed data 
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5.3. Results 
 
5.3.1. Correlation calculation using VAR(5)method 
 
In order to assess if there are contagious effects from the U.S. stock market returns volatility 
to other stock market in the sample, the first attempt is to use  a VAR(5) method. A variance-
covariance matrix was generated for each pair of countries (the U.S. is the fixed element in 
every pair) for each one of the periods (stable, crisis, full).  Using the information from the 
matrix, the cross-correlations (as per the standard definition) between each coefficient 
estimate was calculated. A sample correlation matrix that has been estimated using a variance 
-covariance matrix is given in Appendix III.  
Filtering of the 351 estimates of correlation coefficients (per matrix) obtained is done by 
applying the assumption of endogeneity (refer section 4.5.3). The regression where market 
return x is considered the dependent variable will be omitted, and therefore all correlation 
coefficients related with that particular regression will not be considered for the final analysis 
(From the matrix attached in Appendix III, the data omitted has been highlighted in gray).  
From those selected,  cross-market correlations between own lags (E.g. correlation between 
first lag and second lag of UK returns) were omitted. It is because the focus of the data 
analysis in is essentially on the correlation between returns of two countries, not within each 
country. A simple average of all the selected lagged values is adopted to obtain the single 
parameter figures (E.g. variance of market return x and market return y) and the single 
conditional correlation coefficient between each pair of countries for each different period. 
The variance of each coefficient estimate is calculated as the square of standard error and a 
simple average is taken of all the lagged values' standard error figures. 
Finally, the Fisher's 'z' transformation test for significance is applied for each figure of 
correlation coefficient and compared with the critical value of 1.65 to ascertain whether there 
was contagion or not. It should be emphasized again that all the calculations using this model 
has been done using the parameters of coefficient estimates of the regressors. An inference is 
drawn from the relationship between these beta coefficients as to how the actual variables or 
the market returns behave.  
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These steps are first followed in the calculation of conditional cross-market correlations for 
each of the three periods described. Table 02 displays the results of this initial VAR model 
application for the sample data on stock market returns.  
Table 2: Test for contagion in stock markets: VAR(5) model 
Conditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each country in the 
sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
United States    0.00396       0.00305       0.00140        
Canada    0.00158     -0.22     0.00289    -0.30     0.00118     -0.29     -0.33  N 
France    0.00147     -0.29     0.00228    -0.37     0.00095     -0.36     -0.29  N 
Germany    0.00150     -0.29     0.00240    -0.35     0.00100     -0.34     -0.24  N 
Italy    0.00145     -0.27     0.00209    -0.32     0.00089     -0.31     -0.08  N 
Japan    0.00112     -0.11     0.00130    -0.15     0.00059     -0.14     -0.28  N 
Norway    0.00121     -0.15     0.00184    -0.24     0.00077     -0.23     -0.36  N 
Russia    0.00116     -0.10     0.00165    -0.18     0.00070     -0.17     -0.32  N 
United Kingdom    0.00139     -0.28     0.00235    -0.38     0.00097     -0.36     -0.32  N 
 
Several observations can be seen from the table above. France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom are highly correlated with the U.S. during the relatively stable period. This is not 
surprising since these countries share close trade and financial links, with each country being 
a powerful market in the global financial system. Lowest correlation with the U.S. stock 
market is displayed by Japan and Russia, with correlation coefficients of 0.11 and 0.10 
respectively. Yet again, it is a clear inference for the actual relations between the countries, 
since both Japan and Russia have relatively conventional/restricted financial structures and 
linkages with U.S. economy when compared to the other countries in the sample. 
Another observation is that the conditional correlation coefficients for each country, along 
with the variances of returns, increases directly after the shock in the U.S. market. For an 
example, the variance of return in Canada increases by 84% from the stable period to crisis 
period. This increase in correlation is a pre-requisite for contagion, which is exhibited by 
every country in the sample.  
The final and important observation is that once the test of significance is carried out for the 
increase in cross-market conditional correlations, it is not a statistically significant change to 
be judged as contagion. All the z-statistics are well below the one-sided critical value of 1.65 
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at 5% significant value. Therefore, the clear result is that after testing the conditional cross-
market correlation,  there is no evidence of contagion in any of the pairs of countries.   
As mentioned in several places, a key concept of the theoretical model is that the standard 
correlation coefficient is inaccurate and biased due to heteroskedasticity in market returns. 
More specifically, the relative increase in variance of market returns of the country in which 
the crisis is triggered, cause the corresponding conditional correlation to be biased upwards. It 
means that the increase in correlation coefficients after the manifestation of a shock can 
simply be caused by an increase in market volatility, and such a situation does not qualify as 
contagion.  
A correction to the bias is estimated for each correlation coefficient, leading to the calculation 
of the unconditional cross-market correlation. Table 03 displays the results for the calculated 
unconditional correlation coefficients as well as the significance of each increase between 
periods.  
Table 3: Test for contagion in stock market: VAR(5) model 
Unconditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each country in the 
sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² Ρ σ² ρ     
United States    0.00396       0.00305       0.00140        
Canada    0.00158     -0.22     0.00289    -0.39     0.00118     -0.29     -2.41  C  
France    0.00147     -0.29     0.00228    -0.47     0.00095     -0.36     -2.90  C  
Germany    0.00150     -0.29     0.00240    -0.45     0.00100     -0.34     -2.71  C  
Italy    0.00145     -0.27     0.00209    -0.40     0.00089     -0.31     -2.26  C  
Japan    0.00112     -0.11     0.00130    -0.20     0.00059     -0.14     -1.28  N 
Norway    0.00121     -0.15     0.00184    -0.31     0.00077     -0.23     -1.98  C  
Russia    0.00116     -0.10     0.00165    -0.23     0.00070     -0.17     -1.50  N 
United Kingdom    0.00139     -0.28     0.00235    -0.48     0.00097     -0.36     -3.01  C  
 
The observations from the table above show a drastic change when compared to the previous 
calculations. For one matter, after the bias for heteroskedasticity (or the impact of market 
volatility generated by the U.S.) has been corrected, the crisis period unconditional correlation 
has actually increased when compared to the same figure under conditional correlation 
calculations. Therefore, the change in the correlation coefficient from the stable to crisis 
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period has become more pronounced. After the z-statistic is calculated using the Fisher's z 
transformation method, it is compared with the critical value of 1.65.  
The test for significance gives the verdict of contagion in all countries, except for Japan and 
Russia. This point can be justified in some way according to the brief qualitative analysis of 
the sample countries in Section 5.1. Japan and Russia were able to contain the more 
devastating effects of the global financial crisis which was generated by the Subprime 
mortgage crisis in the U.S. and the fact that these two countries have different financial and 
political structure would have attributed to it. In comparison, United Kingdom who has very 
close financial ties with the U.S. seemed to have been severely affected, according to the 
highly significant z-statistic. Therefore, the estimation of the unconditional cross-market 
correlation using the vector autoregression framework, goes on to find evidence of contagion 
during the recent global financial meltdown. This is even after the correlation factor has been  
adjusted for the heteroskedasticity in market returns.  
 
5.3.1.1.Using significant coefficients in the VAR model 
 
In a regression analysis, a general assessment of the importance of each variable in the 
regression is done using the p-value of the coefficient estimates. If it is less than 0.01, 0.05 or 
even 0.10, then the coefficient is said to be significant, indicating that the inclusion of the 
relevant variable can improve the overall regression
14
.  Applying the same concept to the 
VAR analysis, a simple change was made to the estimation technique. Instead of taking an 
average of all the lagged values when estimating variances and covariance, the significant 
coefficients (of the regression) were identified and an average is taken between those selected 
lagged values, and their parameters such as variance and covariance. Therefore, the 
correlation coefficient is estimated using data only from the significant coefficients, not all the 
coefficients. Other than this minor change, all other filtering assumptions are held constant. 
Table 04 displays the results of calculating the conditional correlation using the average from 
significant coefficients instead of the average of all the coefficients under analysis. 
 
                                                          
14
 A sample regression analysis using VAR(5) method is attached in Appendix IV.  
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Table 4: Test for contagion in stock market: VAR(5) model with significant coefficients 
Conditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each country in the 
sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² Ρ σ² ρ     
United States    0.00406       0.00313       0.00143        
Canada    0.00142     -0.16     0.00295    -0.32     0.00120     -0.31     -0.35  N 
France    0.00151     -0.31     0.00237    -0.40     0.00099     -0.38     -0.32  N 
Germany    0.00154     -0.31     0.00247    -0.36     0.00103     -0.36     -0.00  N 
Italy    0.00148     -0.29     0.00190    -0.31     0.00081     -0.30     -0.09  N 
Japan    0.00115     -0.11     0.00136    -0.19     0.00061     -0.18     -0.34  N 
Norway    0.00110     -0.15     0.00163    -0.17     0.00071     -0.23       1.28  N 
Russia    0.00105     -0.08     0.00152    -0.12     0.00072     -0.15       0.60  N 
United Kingdom    0.00143     -0.30     0.00246    -0.41     0.00101     -0.39     -0.35  N 
 
Similar to the initial analysis, UK, France and Germany shows the highest cross-market 
correlation during both stable and crisis periods, with Japan and Russia having the lowest 
during the period of relative stability. The cross-market correlations as per the standard 
definition ,does not display any drastic changes, though there are difference, when comparing 
these findings with that of the previous VAR estimations. For an example, the crisis period 
correlation in France using average of all regressors is 0.37. The same figure using the 
average of the significant regressors has increase to 0.40. With regard to Norway, the 
correlation using the simple average is 0.24 while the comparable figure using the averages of 
significant regressors yields 0.17. But, yet again the test for significance for the change in 
conditional cross-market correlation does not show positive results of contagion.  
The heteroskedastic bias created by market volatility is quantified using the variance of 
market returns x. The variance of the significant coefficient estimates are used to calculate the 
adjustment factor and then the conditional correlation is corrected to arrive at the 
unconditional correlation coefficient.  
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Table 5: Test for contagion in stock market: VAR(5) analysis with significant coefficients 
Unconditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each country in the 
sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
United States    0.00406       0.00313       0.00143        
Canada    0.00142     -0.16     0.00295    -0.36     0.00120     -0.31     -1.31  N 
France    0.00151     -0.31     0.00237    -0.44     0.00099     -0.38     -1.49  N 
Germany    0.00154     -0.31     0.00247    -0.41     0.00103     -0.36     -1.08  N 
Italy    0.00148     -0.29     0.00190    -0.34     0.00081     -0.30     -1.00  N 
Japan    0.00115     -0.11     0.00136    -0.22     0.00061     -0.18     -0.92  N 
Norway    0.00110     -0.15     0.00163    -0.20     0.00071     -0.23       0.77  N 
Russia    0.00105     -0.08     0.00152    -0.13     0.00072     -0.15       0.25  N 
United Kingdom    0.00143     -0.30     0.00246    -0.45     0.00101     -0.39     -1.56  N 
 
From the table shown above, it can be observed that adjusting for market volatility actually 
increases the cross-market correlation directly after a crisis. The same phenomenon was 
observed in the previous calculations under the VAR framework. An interesting fact is that 
the absolute value of all the z-statistics have increased, except for Norway and Russia. But 
this increase is not substantial enough indicate contagion between the market returns of the 
U.S. and each of the other countries.  
 
5.3.1.2.Summary of VAR results 
Through the VAR(5) analysis, inferences were drawn about the regressors using the 
coefficient estimates, their parameters and relationships. Two types of estimation techniques, 
using the average between all the coefficient estimates and the average of the significant 
coefficient estimates were applied.  Both techniques gave no statistical evidence for contagion 
as per the standard conditional correlation calculations. Only the technique where the average 
of all coefficient estimates was considered, gave statistical evidence that contagion occurred 
in six countries out of the sample. Selecting the significant coefficients still gave the verdict 
of no contagion for all the countries, even though the absolute value of z-statistics were 
considerably higher in all countries except Norway and Russia.  
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A certain debatable point raised by the VAR(5) model is that the variance of stock market 
returns in the U.S. shows a downturn directly after the shock is manifested in the market. This 
causes the unconditional cross-market correlation during the crisis period to be higher than the 
corresponding figure under conditional correlation calculations, whereas it should have been 
lowers according to the calculations of Forbes and Rigobon.  
Such a situation is quite unusual as the general tendency it that the returns (time series data) 
deviates significantly away from the mean when there is turbulence in the market. The one 
reason for such an anomaly can be due to an estimation discrepancy, since the variance of 
U.S. returns fluctuated according to the different dataset as per the estimation method. A 
certain amount of conflict can be caused due to drawing an inference from the standard error 
of each coefficient estimate, instead of the variance between the actual returns,  
 
5.3.2  Correlation calculation using a bivariate model 
 
Due to some inconsistencies seen in the VAR method, a further investigation of data was 
carried out using a different framework.  A simple bivariate  analysis is performed using the 
returns in United States stock market as the independent variable and the returns from the 
other country as the dependent variable. The correlation calculated is between the variables 
themselves, instead of using the beta coefficient parameters as per the VAR framework. Since 
there are no lagged values to be considered, the calculation of the conditional or the standard 
correlation coefficient is straightforward. The following tables showcase the results, along 
with the z-statistics to assess the significance of the shift in correlation coefficients.  
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Table 6: Test for contagion in stock market: Bivariate analysis 
Conditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each country in the 
sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00001       0.00018       0.00008        
Canada    0.00003     0.50     0.00024      0.68     0.00012      0.66         0.93   N  
France    0.00003     0.43     0.00023      0.55     0.00011      0.53         0.48   N  
Germany    0.00003     0.43     0.00019      0.58     0.00010      0.55         0.75   N  
Italy    0.00003     0.38     0.00022      0.49     0.00011      0.48         0.39   N  
Japan    0.00005     0.04     0.00017     -0.03     0.00010     -0.02   -0.27   N  
Norway    0.00008     0.18     0.00036      0.44     0.00020      0.39         1.15   N  
Russia    0.00009     0.15     0.00039      0.25     0.00022      0.22         0.46   N  
United Kingdom    0.00002     0.38     0.00021      0.55     0.00010      0.53         0.58   N  
 
From the table it can be seen that the standard correlation between Canada, France, Germany 
and United Kingdom is high during the period of relative stability in stock markets. Japan  has 
the lowest correlation with the stock markets in the U.S. at 0.04. The variance of returns in all 
the countries increase after a shock , U.S reporting an increase of more than 11 times, U.K by 
8.5 times and Italy by 7.26 times. As a result, the correlation coefficient have  increased as 
well, except in Japan. Correlation between Japan and the United States actually decrease by 
181%, indicating that the crisis generated in the US Subprime mortgage market did not 
immediately create downturn in the Japanese stock markets. The fluctuations in correlation 
estimates are not sufficient enough to validate contagion, since the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected at the 5% significant level.  
It should be kept in mind that an  increase in correlation can be due only to market volatility, 
and such an event foes not constitute contagion. Therefore, the bias created by market 
volatility should be removed for a better analysis. An adjustment factor denoting the relative 
increase in activity within the market where the shock is generated,  is used to recalculate the 
correlation coefficient. Table 07 presents the corrected, unconditional correlation between 
countries as well the test for significance.  
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Table 7: Test for contagion in stock market: Bivariate analysis 
Unconditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each country in the 
sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00001       0.00018       0.00008        
Canada    0.00003     0.50     0.00024      0.26     0.00012      0.66     -11.34   C      
France    0.00003     0.43     0.00023      0.18     0.00011      0.53       -8.74   C      
Germany    0.00003     0.43     0.00019      0.20     0.00010      0.55       -9.12   C      
Italy    0.00003     0.38     0.00022      0.16     0.00011      0.48       -7.74   C 
Japan    0.00005     0.04     0.00017     -0.01     0.00010     -0.02  
       
0.24   N  
Norway    0.00008     0.18     0.00036      0.14     0.00020      0.39       -5.95   C      
Russia    0.00009     0.15     0.00039      0.07     0.00022      0.22       -3.38   C      
United Kingdom    0.00002     0.38     0.00021      0.18     0.00010      0.53       -8.65   C      
 
Recalculation of the correlations after correcting for the heteroskedasticity bias show very 
strong results. The one sided z-statistic is high for every single pair of countries, except 
between Japan and the U.S., inferring that the recent financial crisis has a significant enough 
impact to have contagious effects. Again, countries with whom the United States have strong 
financial links like Canada, Germany and the U.K. show the highest z-statistics with -11.34, -
9.12 and -8.65 respectively. The variance of market returns in the United States after the 
manifestation of a shock was a staggering 11. 22 times more that the variance during periods 
of relative market stability. Adjusting the crisis correlation estimates for this increase in 
variances has caused unconditional correlation coefficient for the crisis period to decline 
drastically, compared to the conditional crisis period correlation estimates. But the correlation 
between returns for the total period under consideration has remained high, and it has resulted 
in a high z-statistics between the countries to constitute contagion. Only in the case of Japan is 
it possible to accept the null hypothesis, because the changes in correlation is not statistically 
significant. A factual study of the economy of Japan during the period of 2007-2008 indicates 
that the stocks markets did not show such a drastic reaction as did the G8 counterparts.  
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5.3.3  Correlation calculation using a multiple regression model 
 
The parameters used in the vector autoregression to estimate correlation factors were  
standard errors of the coefficient (beta) estimates and the covariance between each coefficient 
estimate of the lagged values or the regressors.  A slightly different analysis of data was 
performed expanding the simple bivariate model above to include multiple regressors, all of 
which are the lagged values of returns for each market. Similar to the VAR analysis, five lags 
are adopted for each country's returns. But instead of the covariance between the coefficient 
estimates obtained from a regression analysis, the focus is on the covariance between the 
actual variables or the regressors themselves.   
As in the VAR analysis,  a simple average of all the lagged values is used to arrive at the 
covariance between the variables as well as the variance of the variable x and variable y. 
Using these parameters, the standard correlation or the conditional correlation coefficient is 
calculated.  
Table 8: Test for contagion in stock market: Multiple regression model 
Conditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each country in the 
sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00001       0.00018       0.00008        
Canada    0.00003  
   
0.033     0.00024  
   
0.035     0.00012  
   
0.034  0.005  N  
France    0.00003  
   
0.014     0.00022  
   
0.032     0.00011  
   
0.032  -0.009  N  
Germany    0.00003  
   
0.036     0.00019  
   
0.034     0.00010  
   
0.034  -0.001  N  
Italy    0.00003  
   
0.033     0.00021  
   
0.029     0.00011  
   
0.030  -0.006  N  
Japan    0.00005  
   
0.016     0.00017  
   
0.012     0.00010  
   
0.012  -0.006  N  
Norway    0.00008  
   
0.020     0.00036  
   
0.024     0.00020  
   
0.023  0.023  N  
Russia    0.00009  
   
0.016     0.00039  
   
0.020     0.00022  
   
0.019  0.021  N  
United Kingdom    0.00002  
   
0.033     0.00021  
   
0.033     0.00010  
   
0.033  0.000  N  
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As it can be seen from Table 08, the variance in stock market returns have increased directly 
after the crisis. But the correlation coefficients do not show a noticeably increase; moreover, 
the indicator has actually reduced  in France, Germany, Italy and Japan during the crisis 
period. Therefore, none of the pairs of countries gives results positive towards constituting 
contagion.  
To observe the impact of the heteroskedasticity bias on the correlation estimate, an adjustment 
factor is estimated using the same technique of simple averages. Table 09 shows the 
unconditional correlation estimations for the sample selected.  
Table 9: Test for contagion in stock market: Multiple regression model 
Unconditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each country in the 
sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00001       0.00018       0.00008        
Canada    0.00003     0.033     0.00024     0.010     0.00012     0.034     -0.527   N  
France    0.00003     0.014     0.00022     0.009     0.00011     0.032     -0.495   N  
Germany    0.00003     0.036     0.00019     0.010     0.00010     0.034     -0.525   N  
Italy    0.00003     0.033     0.00021     0.008     0.00011     0.030     -0.459   N  
Japan    0.00005     0.016     0.00017     0.003     0.00010     0.012     -0.190   N  
Norway    0.00008     0.020     0.00036     0.007     0.00020     0.023     -0.351   N  
Russia    0.00009     0.016     0.00039     0.006     0.00022     0.019     -0.284   N  
United Kingdom    0.00002     0.033     0.00021     0.009     0.00010     0.033     -0.505   N  
 
Each of the crisis period correlation reduces once they are corrected for the bias created by 
market volatility. But comparing the correlation coefficients between the period of crisis and 
the full period as per the hypothesis, does not show a significant enough change. None of the 
z-statistics show a figure higher than the critical value at 5% significance level and therefore, 
no indication of contagion is shown through the analysis of cross-market correlations.  
As a control measure, a similar multiple regression analysis was conducted with some minor 
changes to the methodology. Instead of using the average of all the lagged variables, a 
regression analysis was carried out  in order to identify the most significant variables within 
the regression. Once they were identified, the covariance between those variables were 
estimated. Using the corresponding (average) variance of each significant (lagged) variable, 
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the standard correlation was estimated.  Table 10 displays the results obtained through the 
analysis of conditional correlations using the significant variables.   
Table 10: Test for contagion in stock market: Multiple regression model with significant 
coefficients Conditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each 
country in the sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00001       0.00018       0.00008        
Canada    0.00003     0.019     0.00024     0.023     0.00012     0.040  -0.362 N 
France    0.00003     0.038     0.00022     0.036     0.00011     0.041  -0.114 N 
Germany    0.00003     0.038     0.00019     0.037     0.00010     0.037  0.004 N 
Italy    0.00003     0.034     0.00021     0.028     0.00011     0.030  -0.031 N 
Japan    0.00005     0.022     0.00017     0.012     0.00010     0.012  -0.006 N 
Norway    0.00008     0.025     0.00036     0.032     0.00020     0.029  0.057 N 
Russia    0.00009     0.068     0.00039     0.011     0.00022     0.027  -0.349 N 
United Kingdom    0.00002     0.036     0.00021     0.038     0.00010     0.038  0.007 N 
 
Again there is not one single case which qualifies as contagion. Similar to the calculations 
based on the previous technique, selection of significant variables does not make an impact on 
the final results.  
The unconditional correlation is estimated next, using the same adjustment factor. From the 
table 11 in the next page, it can be seen that adjusting for the bias has again resulted in 'no 
contagion', re-enforcing the fact that the changes in the correlation coefficients is cause by 
market volatility, not substantial changes between linkages. One point of discussion can be 
that the volatility in the other market, except U.S., is affecting the cross-market correlation 
estimates.  
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Table 11: Test for contagion in stock market: Multiple regression model with significant 
coefficients Unconditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each 
country in the sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
  
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00001       0.00018       0.00008        
Canada    0.00003     0.019     0.00024     0.007     0.00012     0.040     -0.713   N  
France    0.00003     0.038     0.00022     0.010     0.00011     0.041     -0.662   N  
Germany    0.00003     0.038     0.00019     0.011     0.00010     0.037     -0.572   N  
Italy    0.00003     0.034     0.00021     0.008     0.00011     0.030     -0.466   N  
Japan    0.00005     0.022     0.00017     0.003     0.00010     0.012     -0.190   N  
Norway    0.00008     0.025     0.00036     0.009     0.00020     0.029     -0.429   N  
Russia    0.00009     0.068     0.00039     0.003     0.00022     0.027     -0.517   N  
United Kingdom    0.00002     0.036     0.00021     0.011     0.00010     0.038     -0.579   N  
 
 
5.4  Summary 
 
Results from the test for contagion in stock markets showed certain ambiguity. When 
estimating the correlation coefficient using the standard definition, none of the three different 
techniques showed evidence of contagion. Once the heteroskedastic bias has been corrected 
for and the unconditional correlation is estimated, both the VAR model (using simple 
averages) as well as the bivariate framework  resulted in contagion being identified for most 
of the countries in the sample. Changing the method to take in to account only significant 
variables and their coefficients gave a different picture. In the VAR analysis, the tests for 
significance came close to the critical value at 5%  significance level, but it was not sufficient 
to constitute contagion. In the multiple regressor analysis, there was no significant changes  in 
correlation coefficients either, indicating that there is no evidence of contagion.   
Variance of stock market returns show increases in all of the countries after the crisis was 
generated in the U.S. markets. But it was interesting to observe that when adopting the VAR 
model, the variance in the U.S. actually shows a decline. Other models in contrast show an 
increase in market volatility which is a norm. 
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SECTION SIX: APPLICATION TO BOND MARKETS 
 
The previous section discussed the quantitative analysis carried out in testing for contagion in 
stock market returns during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. This section is dedicated to  
observe the behaviour of bond markets during the same crisis and to find if there is evidence 
of contagion.  
Subsection one gives a brief introduction to the bonds markets, with an emphasis on the 
government bond market. Subsection two provide details on the data and the sample used, 
whereas the methodology has been already described in the previous sections. The results of 
the quantitative study is presented in subsection three with a summary discussion.  
6.1  What is the Bonds Market? 
 
Bonds are known as a fixed income and relatively low-risk debt securities, used by 
companies, governments, municipalities and states to raise funds for a broad range of  
financing purposes. It is one of the three main asset classes after stocks and cash equivalents. 
Even though the bonds market does not receive the same media coverage and popular 
attention, it is a market with substantial value. New debt is issued or existing debts are traded 
in this market, providing much needed long term funding opportunities to private and public 
expenditures. 
When compared to corporate bonds, Government bonds are believed to be considerably low-
risk since they are backed by the 'full faith' of the issuing government. These types of bonds 
are most often issued based on a country's sovereign currency, with the intent of raising 
finance for various national expenditures. Even though these bonds are deemed to be low risk, 
they are by far not risk free since factors such as country risk, political risk, inflation and 
interest rate risk can influence the overall risk status of the government bonds. But reserve 
accumulation and regulatory changes have seen greater cross-border integration of sovereign 
markets, meaning there is a higher percentage of non-resident investors holding government 
securities. And there is also a trend that market-based economies such as the U.S. and the 
U.K. , banks holder a relatively low amount of government bonds in their portfolios. But in 
bank-based financial systems like those in Europe and Canada, government securities make 
up a larger share in the banks' asset holding (Andritzky, 2012).     
73 
 
Government bonds are often in high demand directly after a shock in the stock markets, 
because the investors prefer to switch to the securities which have a generally consistent 
income and duration as well as priority over equity holders. Such a situation was evident 
during the financial crisis in 2007-2008, where many financial institutions including central 
banks invested heavily in government debt. With the following recession and government 
bailouts, most governments found themselves in deep need for cash and thus ended up issuing 
a high amount of government bonds. But many foreign government debt holders pulled out of 
the market, creating a deep crisis in the bonds market. Repercussions were intense, especially 
in the Eurozone countries. Most European countries found themselves submerged in rising  
debt, and crippling downgrading of credit ratings on most of the government bonds created a 
rippling effects throughout the region. With the risk factor having increased many folds, 
governments were forced to issue bonds with high rates of returns. All of these events 
eventually led to a severe sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone starting in 2008.  
6.2  The Data and the Sample  
 
Data to be used for quantitative study of contagion in the government bonds market is 
obtained through DATASTREAM
15
. The application has specially formulated government 
bond indices for most countries, where government bonds of varying maturity periods are 
considered. The focus was on the relatively long-term period and it was decided to utilize data 
obtained from 10-year benchmark (Datastream) Government bonds indices.  
The total return of the bonds are calculated as;  
IVn = IV0 ×(1+TRRn ) 
 
where: 
IVn = closing index value on day n 
IV0 = closing index value on prior day end 
TRRn = total return on day n 
All the bond index values are in US dollar and has been transformed to the first difference of 
the natural logarithm with a two-day moving average.   
                                                          
15
 Datastream by Thomson Reuters is an integrated application providing a wide range of global financial data.  
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It was decided to keep the time period constant to evaluate whether the government bonds 
market was affected during the same period as the stock market during the financial crisis of 
2007-2008. The time period when the Sovereign Debt Crisis in the Eurozone would have 
shown more volatility, but for the purpose of the thesis, the period between 1 January 2005 
and 31 March 2009 is considered as the full period. It is subsequently divided in to two 
groups where relatively stable activity is shown from 1 January 2005 to 31 May 2007 and the 
rest of the time period is specified as the 'crisis' period. 
The sample consists of the members of G8 as well as Norway, similar to stock market 
analysis. But reliable and comparable data was not available for Russia and has therefore has 
been excluded from the sample of countries. The analysis is performed between the U.S,  
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway and U.K.  
6.3  Results 
6.3.1  Correlation calculation using VAR(5)method 
 
A VAR(5) is first used to filter the data and obtain a variance-covariance matrix between the 
coefficient estimates, for each set of countries for all three specified periods. From the 
parameters of coefficient estimates (i.e. variance, covariance) derived from the matrix, the 
correlation coefficients are calculated. The methodology and techniques are similar to those 
applied for stock market analysis. 
A simple average of the parameters (of all the relevant lagged values) is estimated to arrive at 
the single conditional cross-market correlation value for each pair of countries. Table 12 
displayed in the next page shows the results obtained from the calculation of conditional 
correlation between the U.S. and each of the other countries in the sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
Table 12: Test for contagion in Government Bonds market: VAR(5) model 
Conditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each country in the 
sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00483  
 
   0.00309  
 
   0.00160  
 
    
Canada    0.00134  -0.15    0.00152  -0.07    0.00067  -0.09      0.41  N 
France    0.00135  -0.17    0.00163  -0.14    0.00071  -0.15      0.23  N 
Germany    0.00135  -0.17    0.00164  -0.15    0.00071  -0.16      0.16  N 
Italy    0.00135  -0.17    0.00159  -0.13    0.00070  -0.14      0.31  N 
Japan    0.00120  -0.14    0.00174  -0.19    0.00073  -0.18    -0.25  N 
Norway    0.00119  -0.08    0.00157  -0.02    0.00067  -0.04      0.40  N 
United Kingdom    0.00136  -0.19    0.00152  -0.08    0.00067  -0.11      0.60  N 
 
It can be observed that while the variance of bond returns increase in all the countries, the 
average variance in the U.S. actually reduces by 36%. Again it should be highlighted here that 
the variance in U.S. government bond returns changes for each dataset analysis. It is due to 
the fact that the variance is calculated as the square of standard error of each coefficient 
estimate from the regression. For each separate dataset, the variance in bond returns in the 
U.S. show a reduction between the stable period and the crisis period.  
The significance test applied to the conditional cross-market correlation in the government 
bonds market does not give any indication that contagion has occurred. There are no 
significant changes between the correlation coefficients between the periods, which is evident 
from the numbers itself. A point of interest here is that the conditional correlation during the 
crisis period has not increased; rather it has reduced for all the countries, except for Japan. 
The government bonds market in Japan shows the highest volatility, with a 45% increase in 
the variance of returns as well as the highest level of cross-market correlations from all the 
countries in the sample.    
Since the correlation coefficient above is conditional on market volatility, a correction is 
made to remove the effects of such volatility. The unconditional correlation is estimated next 
to observe if the correction of bias will give different outcome.   
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Table 13: Test for contagion in Government Bonds market: VAR(5) model 
Unconditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each country in the 
sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00483  
 
   0.00309  
 
   0.00160  
 
    
Canada    0.00134  -0.15    0.00152  -0.09    0.00067  -0.09      0.02  N 
France    0.00135  -0.17    0.00163  -0.18    0.00071  -0.15    -0.53  N 
Germany    0.00135  -0.17    0.00164  -0.19    0.00071  -0.16    -0.66  N 
Italy    0.00135  -0.17    0.00159  -0.16    0.00070  -0.14    -0.39  N 
Japan    0.00120  -0.14    0.00174  -0.24    0.00073  -0.18    -1.29  N 
Norway    0.00119  -0.08    0.00157  -0.02    0.00067  -0.04      0.30  N 
United Kingdom    0.00136  -0.19    0.00152  -0.10    0.00067  -0.11      0.18  N 
 
It can be seen that after adjusting for heteroskedasticity, the results further reinforce the fact 
that there is no evidence of contagion. It can be an indication that the period specified does 
not show any major fluctuations in the government bonds market, unlike in the stock market. 
But it should also be noted that the test for significance between the correlation coefficients in 
Japan shows a considerably high number when compared to the conditional correlation 
estimate.  
6.3.2  Correlation calculation using a multiple regression model 
 
A further analysis is carried out using a multiple variable model without any lags. In this 
scenario, three months interbank interest rates of the U.S. and other countries' have been 
included as regressors in the equation. Similar to previous tests, the conditional as well as the 
unconditional cross-market correlations is calculated and then tested for significance. Even 
though interest rates have been included as independent variables, correlation is calculated 
only between the two bond market returns.  
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Table 14: Test for contagion in Government Bonds market: Multiple regression model 
Conditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each country in the 
sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
 Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00000       0.00002       0.00001        
Canada    0.00001      0.38     0.00003      0.13     0.00002      0.20     -1.43  N 
France    0.00001      0.40     0.00003      0.21     0.00002      0.26     -1.16  N 
Germany    0.00001      0.40     0.00003      0.23     0.00002      0.27     -1.02  N 
Italy    0.00001      0.40     0.00003      0.15     0.00002      0.22     -1.49  N 
Japan    0.00001      0.18     0.00003      0.38     0.00002      0.33       1.36  N 
Norway    0.00002      0.20     0.00005     -0.10     0.00003     -0.03     -1.56  N 
United Kingdom    0.00001      0.36     0.00003      0.13     0.00002      0.19     -1.38  N 
 
The table above shows that the conditional cross-market correlations between the U.S. and 
Japan and Norway are the lowest, while rest of the countries has a high correlation during the 
stable period.  An interesting observation is that even though the variance of bond returns 
shows a minimal increase from the stable period to crisis period, the correlation coefficient 
has reduced in all the countries, except Japan. It is again an indication that Japan has had close 
linkages with the government bonds market in U.S. when the crisis was taking place. The z-
statistic for almost all the countries are high, even though it does not exceed the critical value 
at 5% significance value.  
Table 15: Test for contagion in Government Bonds market: Multiple regression model 
Unconditional cross-market correlation coefficients and variance for the U.S. and each country in the 
sample is reported. 'C' indicates contagion and 'N' indicates no contagion 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C or N 
  σ² Ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00000       0.00002       0.00001        
Canada    0.00001  0.38    0.00003  0.06    0.00002  0.20    -2.97  C       
France    0.00001  0.40    0.00003  0.10    0.00002  0.26    -3.61  C       
Germany    0.00001  0.40    0.00003  0.11    0.00002  0.27    -3.74  C       
Italy    0.00001  0.40    0.00003  0.07    0.00002  0.22    -3.24  C       
Japan    0.00001  0.18    0.00003  0.19    0.00002  0.33    -3.25  C       
Norway    0.00002  0.20    0.00005  -0.04    0.00003  -0.03    -0.42  N 
United Kingdom    0.00001  0.36    0.00003  0.06    0.00002  0.19    -2.90  C       
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In order to assess the impact of market volatility on the correlation estimates, the 
unconditional correlation coefficient was calculated and the results are shown in Table 15 
(previous page). Adjusting for the heteroskedasticity bias has drastically reduced the 
correlation estimated during the crisis period, as compared to the same figure under 
conditional correlation estimation. Therefore, the change in correlation is significant at the 5% 
significant level, indicating that cross-market linkages have strengthened enough to cause 
contagion in all the countries of the sample, except between the U.S. and Norway.  
6.3.3  Summary of results  
 
Unlike the VAR(5) test applied to the stock market, use of the same method has not found 
evidence of contagion once the unconditional correlation coefficient was estimated. The only 
highlight is that the z-statistic with related to the U.S.-Japan pair of countries indicate an 
increase. It can be due to the fact that Japan was more inclined towards investing in safe 
government securities, and therefore was more exposed to the government debt market.  
A multiple variable model without any lags displayed significant change correlations, 
indicated by higher than 1.65 z-statistics to all the countries except in Norway. An interesting 
observation is that the standard cross-market correlation coefficient under both methods does 
not indicate a significant enough change to constitute contagion.  
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SECTION SEVEN: CONCLUSION, CAVEATS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
The thesis has centered around the key question of whether financial contagion has taken 
place during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Having narrowed down the quantitative 
analysis to the stock markets and government bond markets of the G8 countries and Norway, 
a test for contagion is carried out using the cross-market correlation coefficient between asset 
returns. The period defined for the analysis is a span of more than four years, during which 
the crisis began and reached a peak.  
As per the article on which the theoretical model is based on, Forbes and Rigobon argue that 
the standard correlation calculation is inaccurate when testing for contagion. Since the 
coefficient is conditional on market volatility, it is biased upwards when a crisis increases the 
volatility of market returns. They propose an adjustment to this heteroskedastic bias and use it 
to formulate a corrected correlation coefficient named as 'unconditional correlation 
coefficient'. By analyzing the stock market returns during three selected financial crises of 
selected countries, they emphasize that while the standard correlation estimation gives a 
higher indication of contagion, the adjusted correlation reveals limited results of contagion. 
The key idea behind this is that an increase on cross-market correlation can be due to only an 
increase in market volatility and thereby does not constitute actual contagion. In order to find 
out if the cross-market correlations have changed significantly after a shock to one market, the 
increase in variance of returns (market volatility) should be removed.  
In applying the framework to the stock market returns, a VAR(5) model, a simple bivariate 
analysis and a multiple regression model were adopted. With regard to the quantitative study 
carried out on the stock markets, the overall results can be seen as mixed or somewhat 
inconclusive. When the conditional correlation was estimated, all three techniques 
demonstrated that significance tests yielded the result of no contagion in all instances. But 
once the market volatility was corrected for and the unconditional correlation was estimated, 
the VAR(5) model and the bivariate model showed some indication of contagious effects 
from the U.S. to the European countries and Canada. Even though Norway was a country 
hailed to have weathered the financial crisis of 2007-2008 in a better manner, the stock 
market is seen to have been vulnerable to the activities abroad. Russia and Japan had the least 
tendency to show evidence for contagion, and this fact can be justified using information from 
the description of the sample. Inevitably, the stock markets of each country reacted to the 
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crisis spilling from the U.S. and the transmission mechanisms at that instance would have 
primarily been investor behavior. Stock markets are very sensitive to the information 
asymmetries, and therefore rational or irrational decision of the investors in the face of certain 
events cause many market to move together. Given the scale and impact of the subprime 
mortgage crisis in the U.S., it is difficult to proclaim that it is only market volatility stemming 
from the U.S. that is causing the increase in cross-market correlations. Market volatility in 
each of the other markets have been equally strong, indicating that some form of fundamental 
changes have taken place with regard to cross-market linkages.  
The multiple regression model, where parameters such as variance, covariance are between 
the lagged values themselves came up with insignificant z-statistics with regard to the test for 
contagion. Only a slight increase in the significance test is recorded between the conditional 
correlations and the unconditional correlations.   
It is difficult to draw a concrete conclusions from the results on contagion occurring in the 
stock markets. The VAR model has certain elements that can be estimated different or even 
interpreted in a different manner. To what length inferences can be drawn by the analysis 
using coefficient estimates and their parameters are arguable. Unlike the analysis carried out 
by Forbes and Rigobon, the time period utilized in this study is much longer, especially the 
period of crisis. For such a lengthy period of time, there is a vast amount of data leaving room 
for estimation error. As it was shown by the lag selection test, the most appropriate number of 
lags should be more than 10 whereas the methodology uses only five lags in its estimations. 
This simple point creates an discrepancy between the statistically appropriate methods and the 
subjective use of certain measurement. 
Another inconsistency encountered in the VAR(5) model was that the variance of stock 
market returns in U.S. shows a relative decrease, instead of the expected increase. This leads 
to a question as to whether there is an actual requirements for the heteroskedastic bias to be 
corrected. It might be an estimation error, but the fact that contagious effects can stem from 
other markets cannot be ignored as well. Since the unconditional correlation in the VAR 
model indicates contagion, a shift in variance of returns in other countries might have a 
counter-effect causing the significance shift in correlations between the defined periods.  
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Given that the VAR model using lagged values have certain disparities, a more consistent and 
relatively safe  model to follow would be the bivariate analysis. This method indicated that all 
countries in the sample, except Japan are experiencing contagious effects from the U.S. stock 
market. Even though there might not be problems regard to an appropriate lag length or 
shortcomings in drawing inferences from regression coefficients estimates, this model cannot 
be incorporated with the effects of interest rates, and also the predictive value of previous 
market returns cannot be utilized.  
With regard to the government bonds market, application of the VAR(5) model shows that no 
significant changes in the correlations have occurred during the crisis. Therefore, there is no 
financial contagion during the financial crisis in the particular market. In sharp contrast, a 
multiple variable model, which includes bond market returns (without lagged values) and 
interest rates of the two countries under consideration, indicate that contagion has occurred in 
all the countries in the sample except for Norway. Due to difficulty in obtaining reliable 
information, it was difficult to link this finding with the actual events that would have taken 
place during the crisis. It was noted that the correlation factors have reduced from the stable 
period to crisis period when applying both methods, even though the variance has increased. 
Therefore, it is obvious there are other factors influencing the cross-market correlation 
coefficient.   
Taking all the factors given above in to consideration, a generalized conclusion can be made 
that the financial crisis of 2007-2008 had some form of contagious effect on the stock markets 
in the G8 countries and Norway. Japan was identified by two methods to be the market in 
which contagion did not occur and Russia was included in one method. The volatility on the 
other markets seemed to have contributed to this facts as well. In connection with the 
government bonds market, there is not concrete evidence of contagion occurring.  
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Caveats and Possible Extensions 
 
The definition of contagion used in the thesis is somewhat restricted, even though it provides 
a straightforward framework to carry out empirical studies. It mentions that contagion is a 
significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock in one or group of markets. Such a 
definition facilitates the utilization of correlation between asset returns to test for contagion, 
but it does not provide a definition for the actual linkages between the countries. Meaning, 
this definition avoids differentiating and measuring the various transmission mechanisms. 
While it makes the statistical analysis relatively straightforward, the narrow definition can be 
limiting when interpreting the results obtained from the quantitative study.  
A key concept in the theoretical model is that since the correlation estimations traditionally 
finds evidence of contagion because it is conditional on market volatility, and biased upwards 
when there is high comovement in the market after a crisis. The adjustment factor for this bias 
is based on two assumption of  no endogeneity and no omitted variables. The assumption of 
endogeneity has especially been enforced in filtering the data in VAR model. If any of the 
dataset find evidence that there is feedback from the market y to market x, the correction of 
the bias will be invalid.  
Treatment of interest rates in the government bonds market can be challenged since they are 
much more important in connection to valuing bonds rather than stock market. The option of 
including other economic indicators such as the Gross Domestic Produces, the exchanges rate, 
etc. would have made the regression less limited.  
The hypothesis tested by the framework is comparing the correlation coefficient in the crisis 
period with that of the full period. Correction for the bias is performed on the correlation 
during the crisis period and effectively, the stable and full period correlation coefficients will 
remain constant (same as the value as conditional correlation). But it should be pointed out 
that the full period includes the period in which a shock was generated causing the market 
returns to increase. A point of debate is raised as to why the full period correlation is not 
adjusted for the volatility in market returns as well.   A robust test is attached in the Appendix 
to evaluate whether a test for significance using the hypothesis constructed by correlation 
during the stable period and the crisis period, instead of full period and crisis period 
correlation display drastic differences.  
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Appendix I : Definition of financial crises by Events (Reinhart and Rogoff : 'This Time is Different') 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Defining Crises by Events:  A Summary 
Type of Crisis Definition and/or Criteria Comments 
 
 
Banking crisis 
 
Type I: 
systemic/severe 
Type II: 
financial 
distress/ milder 
We mark a banking crisis by two types 
of events: (1) bank runs that lead to the 
closure, merging, or takeover by the 
public sector of one or more financial 
institutions; and (2) if there are no runs, 
the closure, merging, takeover, or 
large-scale government assistance of an 
important financial institution (or group 
of institutions), that marks the start of a 
string of similar outcomes for other 
financial institutions.   
This approach to dating the beginning of a 
banking crisis is not without drawbacks.  It 
could date a crisis too late, because the 
financial problems usually begin well before 
a bank is finally closed or merged; it could 
also date a crisis too early, because the worst 
part of a crisis may come later.  Unlike the 
external debt crises (see below), which have 
well-defined closure dates, it is often difficult 
or impossible to accurately pinpoint the year 
in which a crisis ended. 
Debt crises: 
External 
A sovereign default is defined as the 
failure to meet a principal or interest 
payment on the due date (or within the 
specified grace period).  The episodes 
also include instances where 
rescheduled debt is ultimately 
extinguished in terms less favorable 
than the original obligation. 
While the time of default is accurately 
classified as a crisis year there are a large 
number of cases where the final resolution 
with the creditors (if it ever did take place) 
seems interminable.  Fort his reason we also 
work with a crisis dummy that only picks up 
the first year. 
Debt crisis: 
Domestic 
The definition given above for external 
debt applies. In addition, domestic debt 
crises have involved the freezing of 
bank deposits and or forcible 
conversions of such deposits from 
dollars to local currency. 
There is at best some partial documentation 
of recent defaults on domestic debt provided 
by Standard and Poors. Historically, it is very 
difficult to date these episodes and in many 
cases  (like banking crises) it is impossible to 
ascertain the date of the final resolution. 
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Appendix II : Stock Market volatility during the financial crisis  
S&P 500: Movement of Stock Market Index in the U.S. (Period 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2009) 
 
S&P/TSX Composite Index : Movement of Stock Market Index in Canada (Period 1 January 2005 to 31 
March 2009) 
 
CAC 40: Movement of Stock Market Index in France (Period 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2009) 
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DAX : Movement of Stock Market Index in Germany (Period 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2009) 
 
NIKKEI 225: Movement of Stock Market Index in Japan (Period 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2009) 
 
FTSE MIB: Movement of Stock Market Index in Italy (Period 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2009) 
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RTSI INDEX: Movement of Stock Market Index in Russia (Period 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2009) 
 
FTSE 100: Movement of Stock Market Index in U.K.  (Period 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2009) 
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Appendix IV: VAR analysis for stock market returns of U.S. and U.K.  
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0000137   .0001051     0.13   0.897    -.0001924    .0002197
     fdintUK     .0247417   .0315101     0.79   0.432     -.037017    .0865003
    fdintUSA    -.0226506   .0333073    -0.68   0.496    -.0879317    .0426304
              
         L5.     .0112819   .0390277     0.29   0.773    -.0652109    .0877748
         L4.    -.3348099   .0375252    -8.92   0.000    -.4083581   -.2612618
         L3.     -.017087   .0452697    -0.38   0.706     -.105814    .0716401
         L2.    -.6657496   .0374251   -17.79   0.000    -.7391015   -.5923977
         L1.    -.0446333   .0369368    -1.21   0.227     -.117028    .0277614
      fdrUSA  
              
         L5.     .0306783   .0289124     1.06   0.289     -.025989    .0873456
         L4.    -.0084765   .0298485    -0.28   0.776    -.0669786    .0500255
         L3.     .0203505   .0350011     0.58   0.561    -.0482504    .0889515
         L2.     .0033482   .0299966     0.11   0.911     -.055444    .0621403
         L1.     .0423867   .0304996     1.39   0.165    -.0173915    .1021648
       fdrUK  
fdrUSA        
                                                                              
       _cons     2.82e-06   .0001268     0.02   0.982    -.0002456    .0002513
     fdintUK    -.0069285   .0379894    -0.18   0.855    -.0813864    .0675294
    fdintUSA     .0086496   .0401561     0.22   0.829     -.070055    .0873542
              
         L5.     .1513452   .0470528     3.22   0.001     .0591234    .2435671
         L4.      .101241   .0452415     2.24   0.025     .0125694    .1899126
         L3.     .3970833   .0545784     7.28   0.000     .2901116     .504055
         L2.     .1149205   .0451208     2.55   0.011     .0264854    .2033555
         L1.      .480833    .044532    10.80   0.000      .393552     .568114
      fdrUSA  
              
         L5.      .015942   .0348576     0.46   0.647    -.0523777    .0842616
         L4.    -.3228026   .0359862    -8.97   0.000    -.3933343   -.2522709
         L3.    -.1633195   .0421983    -3.87   0.000    -.2460267   -.0806124
         L2.    -.6712158   .0361647   -18.56   0.000    -.7420972   -.6003344
         L1.    -.2290329   .0367712    -6.23   0.000    -.3011031   -.1569628
       fdrUK  
fdrUK         
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
fdrUSA               13     .003133   0.3282   427.5352   0.0000
fdrUK                13     .003778   0.3733   521.3116   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  1.14e-10                         SBIC            = -17.02146
FPE            =  1.21e-10                         HQIC            = -17.10906
Log likelihood =  7534.956                         AIC             = -17.16333
Sample:  1/7/2005 - 5/31/2007                      No. of obs      =       875
Vector autoregression
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Appendix V: Robust test for contagion comparing the stable period correlation and crisis period 
correlation 
A robust test is carried out to identify whether changing the test hypothesis would have a significant 
impact the results of contagion. 
APPLICATION TO STOCK MARKET  
Test of Contagion using bivariate analysis  
Conditional cross-market correlation 
 
Unconditional cross-market correlation 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00001       0.00018       0.00008        
Canada    0.00003     0.499     0.00024       0.257     0.00012       0.658     -5.55   C  
France    0.00003     0.426     0.00023       0.183     0.00011       0.530     -5.24   C  
Germany    0.00003     0.431     0.00019       0.198     0.00010       0.553     -5.08   C  
Italy    0.00003     0.379     0.00022       0.159     0.00011       0.477     -4.63   C  
Japan    0.00005     0.041     0.00017     -0.009     0.00010     -0.020     -0.98   N  
Norway    0.00008     0.177     0.00036       0.137     0.00020       0.392     -0.79   N  
Russia    0.00009     0.146     0.00039       0.072     0.00022       0.225     -1.45   N  
United Kingdom    0.00002     0.375     0.00021       0.184     0.00010       0.527     -4.06   C  
 
These results confirm that there are certain contagious effects between U.S. and the other markets 
of the sample. Even though conditional correlation calculations indicate contagion in all countries, 
other than Japan, adjusting for the bias of market volatility, it is revealed that contagion did not 
occur in Norway and Russia as previously shown.  
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00001       0.00018       0.00008        
Canada    0.00003     0.499     0.00024       0.681     0.00012       0.658       5.51   C  
France    0.00003     0.426     0.00023       0.546     0.00011       0.530       3.07   C  
Germany    0.00003     0.431     0.00019       0.577     0.00010       0.553       3.82   C  
Italy    0.00003     0.379     0.00022       0.491     0.00011       0.477       2.71   C  
Japan    0.00005     0.041     0.00017     -0.033     0.00010     -0.020     -1.44   N  
Norway    0.00008     0.177     0.00036       0.436     0.00020       0.392       5.61   C  
Russia    0.00009     0.146     0.00039       0.245     0.00022       0.225       2.01   C  
United Kingdom    0.00002     0.375     0.00021       0.547     0.00010       0.527       4.27   C  
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Test of Contagion using multiple regression model 
Conditional cross-market correlation  
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00001       0.00018       0.00008        
Canada    0.00003     0.033     0.00024     0.035     0.00012     0.034       0.02   N  
France    0.00003     0.014     0.00022     0.032     0.00011     0.032       0.34   N  
Germany    0.00003     0.036     0.00019     0.034     0.00010     0.034     -0.05   N  
Italy    0.00003     0.033     0.00021     0.029     0.00011     0.030     -0.06   N  
Japan    0.00005     0.016     0.00017     0.012     0.00010     0.012     -0.08   N  
Norway    0.00008     0.020     0.00036     0.024     0.00020     0.023       0.09   N  
Russia    0.00009     0.016     0.00039     0.020     0.00022     0.019       0.07   N  
United Kingdom    0.00002     0.033     0.00021     0.033     0.00010     0.033     -0.01   N  
 
Unconditional cross-market correlation 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00001       0.00018       0.00008        
Canada    0.00003     0.033     0.00024     0.010     0.00012     0.034     -0.46   N  
France    0.00003     0.014     0.00022     0.009     0.00011     0.032     -0.10   N  
Germany    0.00003     0.036     0.00019     0.010     0.00010     0.034     -0.52   N  
Italy    0.00003     0.033     0.00021     0.008     0.00011     0.030     -0.47   N  
Japan    0.00005     0.016     0.00017     0.003     0.00010     0.012     -0.24   N  
Norway    0.00008     0.020     0.00036     0.007     0.00020     0.023     -0.25   N  
Russia    0.00009     0.016     0.00039     0.006     0.00022     0.019     -0.21   N  
United Kingdom    0.00002     0.033     0.00021     0.009     0.00010     0.033     -0.46   N  
 
Conditional cross-market correlation: Multiple regression model with significant coefficients 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00001       0.00018       0.00008        
Canada    0.00003     0.019     0.00024     0.023     0.00012     0.040       0.07   N  
France    0.00003     0.038     0.00022     0.036     0.00011     0.041     -0.04   N  
Germany    0.00003     0.038     0.00019     0.037     0.00010     0.037     -0.01   N  
Italy    0.00003     0.034     0.00021     0.028     0.00011     0.030     -0.11   N  
Japan    0.00005     0.022     0.00017     0.012     0.00010     0.012     -0.20   N  
Norway    0.00008     0.025     0.00036     0.032     0.00020     0.029       0.12   N  
Russia    0.00009     0.068     0.00039     0.011     0.00022     0.027     -1.11   N  
United Kingdom    0.00002     0.036     0.00021     0.038     0.00010     0.038       0.05   N  
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Unconditional cross-market correlation: Multiple regression model with significant coefficients 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00001       0.00018       0.00008        
Canada    0.00003     0.019     0.00024     0.007     0.00012     0.040     -0.25   N  
France    0.00003     0.038     0.00022     0.010     0.00011     0.041     -0.54   N  
Germany    0.00003     0.038     0.00019     0.011     0.00010     0.037     -0.53   N  
Italy    0.00003     0.034     0.00021     0.008     0.00011     0.030     -0.50   N  
Japan    0.00005     0.022     0.00017     0.003     0.00010     0.012     -0.36   N  
Norway    0.00008     0.025     0.00036     0.009     0.00020     0.029     -0.32   N  
Russia    0.00009     0.068     0.00039     0.003     0.00022     0.027     -1.26   N  
United Kingdom    0.00002     0.036     0.00021     0.011     0.00010     0.038     -0.48   N  
 
As reflected by the hypothesis comparing correlation of the full period and the crisis period, all 
estimations using the multiple regression model indicates that contagion has not occurred between 
the markets.  
Test of Contagion using VAR(5) model 
Conditional cross-market correlation: VAR model  
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA     0.00396       0.00305       0.00140        
Canada    0.00158     -0.222     0.00289     -0.304     0.00118     -0.290     -1.71   C  
France    0.00147     -0.292     0.00228     -0.369     0.00095     -0.358     -1.69   C  
Germany    0.00150     -0.291     0.00240     -0.353     0.00100     -0.343     -1.35   N  
Italy    0.00145     -0.275     0.00209     -0.317     0.00089     -0.314     -0.90   N  
Japan    0.00112     -0.109     0.00130     -0.155     0.00059     -0.142     -0.91   N  
Norway    0.00121     -0.150     0.00184     -0.243     0.00077     -0.227     -1.88   C  
Russia    0.00116     -0.100     0.00165     -0.180     0.00070     -0.165     -1.58   N  
United Kingdom    0.00139     -0.276     0.00235     -0.377     0.00097     -0.364     -2.21   C  
 
Unconditional cross-market correlation: VAR model  
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA     0.00396       0.00305       0.00140        
Canada    0.00158     -0.222     0.00289     -0.389     0.00118     -0.290     -3.58   C  
France    0.00147     -0.292     0.00228     -0.469     0.00095     -0.358     -4.04   C  
Germany    0.00150     -0.291     0.00240     -0.449     0.00100     -0.343     -3.57   C  
Italy    0.00145     -0.275     0.00209     -0.405     0.00089     -0.314     -2.86   C  
Japan    0.00112     -0.109     0.00130     -0.200     0.00059     -0.142     -1.82   C  
Norway    0.00121     -0.150     0.00184     -0.312     0.00077     -0.227     -3.34   C  
Russia    0.00116     -0.100     0.00165     -0.232     0.00070     -0.165     -2.64   C  
United Kingdom    0.00139     -0.276     0.00235     -0.479     0.00097     -0.364     -4.63   C  
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Conditional cross-market correlation: VAR model with significant coefficients 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00406       0.00313       0.00143        
Canada    0.00142     -0.077     0.00295     -0.323     0.00120     -0.308     -4.98   C  
France    0.00151     -0.310     0.00237     -0.397     0.00099     -0.384     -1.92   C  
Germany    0.00154     -0.308     0.00247     -0.364     0.00103     -0.364     -1.24   N  
Italy    0.00148     -0.290     0.00190     -0.307     0.00081     -0.303     -0.36   N  
Japan    0.00115     -0.115     0.00136     -0.193     0.00061     -0.177     -1.55   N  
Norway    0.00110     -0.153     0.00163     -0.172     0.00071     -0.230     -0.39   N  
Russia    0.00105     -0.079     0.00152     -0.118     0.00072     -0.145     -0.77   N  
United Kingdom    0.00143     -0.298     0.00246     -0.408     0.00101     -0.395     -2.46   C  
 
Unconditional cross-market correlation: VAR model with significant coefficients 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00406       0.00313       0.00143        
Canada    0.00142     -0.077     0.00295     -0.362     0.00120     -0.308     -5.85   C  
France    0.00151     -0.310     0.00237     -0.442     0.00099     -0.384     -2.98   C  
Germany    0.00154     -0.308     0.00247     -0.407     0.00103     -0.364     -2.21   C  
Italy    0.00148     -0.290     0.00190     -0.344     0.00081     -0.303     -1.18   N  
Japan    0.00115     -0.115     0.00136     -0.218     0.00061     -0.177     -2.07   C  
Norway    0.00110     -0.153     0.00163     -0.195     0.00071     -0.230     -0.85   N  
Russia    0.00105     -0.079     0.00152     -0.134     0.00072     -0.145     -1.08   N  
United Kingdom    0.00143     -0.298     0.00246     -0.454     0.00101     -0.395     -3.54   C  
 
The VAR analysis shows that most of the countries have experienced contagion in all estimations, 
with the exception of Norway and Russia in almost all the cases. 
GOVERNMENT BONDS MARKET 
Test of Contagion using VAR(5) model 
Conditional cross-market correlation: VAR model  
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00483       0.00309       0.00160        
Canada    0.00134     -0.146     0.00152     -0.073     0.00067     -0.092       1.43   N  
France    0.00135     -0.173     0.00163     -0.141     0.00071     -0.151       0.64   N  
Germany    0.00135     -0.174     0.00164     -0.152     0.00071     -0.160       0.42   N  
Italy    0.00135     -0.172     0.00159     -0.129     0.00070     -0.143       0.86   N  
Japan    0.00120     -0.145     0.00174     -0.193     0.00073     -0.182     -0.97   N  
Norway    0.00119     -0.077     0.00157     -0.018     0.00067     -0.036       1.15   N  
United Kingdom    0.00136     -0.190     0.00152     -0.079     0.00067     -0.107       2.20   C  
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Unconditional cross-market correlation: VAR model  
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00483       0.00309       0.00160        
Canada    0.00134     -0.146     0.00152     -0.091     0.00067     -0.092       1.08   N  
France    0.00135     -0.173     0.00163     -0.175     0.00071     -0.151     -0.04   N  
Germany    0.00135     -0.174     0.00164     -0.189     0.00071     -0.160     -0.31   N  
Italy    0.00135     -0.172     0.00159     -0.160     0.00070     -0.143       0.24   N  
Japan    0.00120     -0.145     0.00174     -0.239     0.00073     -0.182     -1.91   C  
Norway    0.00119     -0.077     0.00157     -0.023     0.00067     -0.036       1.07   N  
United Kingdom    0.00136     -0.190     0.00152     -0.098     0.00067     -0.107       1.82   C  
 
In the government bonds market, Japan and United Kingdom shows that contagion has occurred, 
which is evident from the significant changes in the correlation between the U.S. and Japan.  
Test of Contagion using multiple regression model 
Conditional cross-market correlation: Multiple regression model 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00000       0.00002       0.00001        
Canada    0.00001       0.383     0.00003       0.131     0.00002       0.196     -5.30   C  
France    0.00001       0.400     0.00003       0.207     0.00002       0.258     -4.14   C  
Germany    0.00001       0.400     0.00003       0.230     0.00002       0.274     -3.69   C  
Italy    0.00001       0.398     0.00003       0.149     0.00002       0.216     -5.28   C  
Japan    0.00001       0.180     0.00003       0.381     0.00002       0.326       4.28   C  
Norway    0.00002       0.201     0.00005     -0.098     0.00003     -0.026     -5.87   C  
United Kingdom    0.00001       0.360     0.00003       0.129     0.00002       0.192     -4.81   C  
 
Unconditional cross-market correlation: Multiple regression model 
Country Stable Turmoil Full z-stat C/N 
  σ² ρ σ² ρ σ² ρ     
USA    0.00000       0.00002       0.00001        
Canada    0.00001       0.383     0.00003       0.060     0.00002       0.196     -6.68   C  
France    0.00001       0.400     0.00003       0.097     0.00002       0.258     -6.34   C  
Germany    0.00001       0.400     0.00003       0.108     0.00002       0.274     -6.14   C  
Italy    0.00001       0.398     0.00003       0.069     0.00002       0.216     -6.86   C  
Japan    0.00001       0.180     0.00003       0.186     0.00002       0.326       0.13   N  
Norway    0.00002       0.201     0.00005     -0.045     0.00003     -0.026     -4.84   C  
United Kingdom    0.00001       0.360     0.00003       0.060     0.00002       0.192     -6.18   C  
 
The results from the multiple regression model is drastically different, where all the countries except 
for Japan is seen to experience contagion. 
